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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment of the trial court. This Court 
has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(j) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in ruling that the Uintah Basin Medical Center's 
Board of Trustees properly terminated the pathology services agreement 
with Leo W. Hardy, M.D. ("Dr. Hardy") on July 18,1996? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's application of law to the undisputed 
facts in summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Utah Dep't. of 
Tramp., 1999 UT App. 227, f 12, 986 P.2d 752, 757. 
Preservation of Issue. Dr. Hardy raised this issue in his Supplemental Brief 
on Issue of Whether Contract Impermissibly Binds Successor Boards. (R.991-
1018.) 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The decision in this appeal is governed by common law and thus no statutes, 
constitutional provisions, ordinances, or rules are determinative. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a breach of contract case involving a professional services contract for 
pathology services (the "Agreement") entered into by Dr. Hardy and the Uintah 
Basin Medical Center ("UBMC"). The Agreement, executed on November 29,1994, 
recited no termination date, but instead was terminable "for just cause." Despite the 
fact that Dr. Hardy never received complaints from UBMC or its medical staff 
regarding his services between November of 1994 and July of 1996, UBMC 
terminated the Agreement on July 18,1996. At the same time, UBMC hired Dr. 
Thomas Allred to provide pathology and emergency room services for the hospital. 
Although it originally maintained that the trial court should impose a 
contractual duration of two years since the Agreement did not include a term of 
duration, UBMC later argued that the Agreement was voidable because it 
impermissibly bound successor boards. Dr. Hardy disputed the application of this 
law as suggested by UBMC. However, on summary judgment, the trial court agreed 
with UBMC's analysis and ruled that the Agreement was voidable by UBMC 
successor boards of trustees. The trial court further determined that the board seated 
in 1996 was a "successor" board and that the Agreement therefore properly had been 
terminated by a July 18,1996 vote of the UBMC board of trustees. 
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Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below 
On October 28, 1996, UBMC filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
ruling on the parties' rights under the Agreement. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Hardy filed 
a counterclaim against UBMC for breach of contract. On June 19,1998, Dr. Hardy 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on his breach of contract counterclaim 
asserting that UBMC terminated the Agreement without just cause as required by the 
terms of the Agreement. UBMC subsequently filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment seeking a determination that the Agreement contained no term of duration 
and that it was therefore reasonable for the trial court to infer a two-year durational 
term. The trial court denied both motions on the ground that material facts remained 
in dispute. After engaging in extensive discovery, the parties stipulated to certain 
material facts and filed renewed motions for summary judgment on the question of 
whether Dr. Hardy's "just cause" contract was enforceable under Utah law. In its 
reply memorandum, UBMC argued for the first time that because UBMC is a 
governmental entity, its successor board could not be bound by the Agreement. 
The trial court heard oral argument on the renewed motions for summary 
judgment and ruled from the bench that Dr. Hardy's "just cause" contract was 
enforceable under Utah law, and that the question of whether UBMC had just 
cause to terminate the Agreement should be resolved by the jury. The trial court 
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then allowed the parties to file additional briefs on the issue of whether the 
Agreement was voidable by a UBMC successor board. In a written ruling issued 
on April 6, 2000, the trial court concluded that the Agreement could not be 
enforced against UBMC's successor boards. (A copy of the trial court's ruling is 
included in the Addendum.) The trial court further ruled that because the ten-
member board in place when the Agreement was terminated included three new 
members, it was a successor board with the legal right to terminate the Agreement 
at any time. On that basis, the trial court denied Dr. Hardy's renewed motion for 
summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of UBMC. 
The trial court entered a judgment and order dismissing Dr. Hardy's breach of 
contract counterclaim on May 18,2000. (A copy of the trial court's order is included 
in the Addendum.) 
Statement of Facts 
1. Dr. Hardy is a board certified pathologist. (R. 189.) 
2. UBMC is the business name for Duchesne County Hospital which is 
owned by Duchesne County and operated by UBMC's Board of Trustees (the 
"Board"). (R.304.) 
3. On November 29,1994, Dr. Hardy and UBMC entered into the 
Agreement in which Dr. Hardy agreed to provide professional services for UBMC 
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as director of the hospital's pathology laboratory and to perform related duties. (A 
copy of the Agreement is included in the Addendum.) The language of the 
Agreement was taken from a contract between UBMC and Dr. Sannella (a 
pathologist at UBMC who immediately preceded Dr. Hardy). Dr. Hardy modified 
the contract slightly and returned the edited contract to UBMC. The Agreement 
was then typed onto Duchesne County Hospital letterhead and signed by Bradley 
D. LeBaron, who was UBMC's administrator and who had authority to enter into 
personal service contracts on UBMC's behalf. Although the Agreement was 
executed on November 29,1994, it became effective August 1, 1994, the date upon 
which Dr. Hardy first began providing pathology services to UBMC. (R. 185-86, 
189,546.) 
4. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides: 
This agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and 
continue to bind the parties to the terms hereof until terminated 
after ninety (90) days written notice for just cause of 
termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties 
to a shorter notice period. 
(R. 185-86, 546.) 
5. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Dr. Hardy agreed to (a) be 
available for physician consults to interpret laboratory results; (b) visit the UBMC 
hospital weekly for one to two hours to recommend processes and policies to 
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assure smooth operation of the UBMC laboratory; and (c) undertake teaching 
activities when new procedures were introduced. (R.l85-86.) 
6. The Board is the entity authorized to terminate personal services 
contract. (R.546.) 
7. The Board consists of nine voting members, seven of whom are 
appointed for a three-year term. Two of these members are appointed for a term of 
indefinite duration. In addition, the hospital administrator serves as a non-voting 
member of the Board, and his tenure also has no stated term of duration. The 
UBMC Bylaws provide as follows: 
Board of Trustees. The Uintah Basin Medical Center 
Board of Trustees, created by the Duchesne County 
Commission shall constitute the Board of Trustees and 
shall be known as the Board of Trustees of the Uintah 
Basin Medical Center. 
The Board of Trustees shall consist of nine (9) voting 
members, seven of which are appointed elected [sic] for 
three (3) year [sic]. Board members are eligible to fill a 
maximum of two consecutive three (3) year terms. 
County Commission Representative (Ex Officio). There 
shall at all times be a member of the Duchesne County 
Commission on the Board of Trustees. That Board 
member will be selected by the Duchesne County 
Commission and shall serve as an ex officio member of 
the Board. This representative is a voting member of the 
Board. 
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Medical Staff Representative (Ex Officio). The Board of 
Trustees shall have as a member the Chief of Medical 
Staff of Duchesne County Hospital who shall be 
nominated by the Medical Staff and who shall serve as an 
ex officio member of the Board. This representative is a 
voting member of the Board of Trustees. 
Hospital Administrator (Ex Officio w/o vote). The 
Administrator of the Hospital shall serve as a non-voting 
member of the Board. 
* * * 
Appointment and Vacancies. All appointments to fill 
vacancies on the Board of Trustees shall be made by the 
County Commission, whether such vacancies occur by 
death, resignation, removal, expiration of term, increase 
or decrease in the number of Board members. The 
Commission will be provided recommended nominees by 
the Hospital Board of Trustees. ... 
(R.993-1002, a copy of the Bylaws is included in the Addendum.) 
8. On July 18, 1996, the Board voted to terminate the Agreement and to 
invite Dr. Thomas J. Allred to join UBMC's medical staff as a pathologist and as 
an emergency room physician. (R.290A, 290-91, 304, 545.) 
9. Between the time the Board entered into the Agreement with Dr. 
Hardy and the time it terminated that Agreement, three new voting members had 
been appointed to the Board. (R.1027.) 
7 
10. Dr. Hardy continued working for UBMC until October 28, 1996, 
approximately 90 days after UBMC notified him it was terminating the 
Agreement. (R.189, 545.) 
11. Prior to his termination, Dr. Hardy performed his obligations under 
the Agreement satisfactorily and received no complaints from UBMC or its 
medical staff. After termination of the Agreement, on a few occasions, at the 
request of members of the UBMC medical staff, and with the approval of the 
UBMC administration, Dr. Hardy performed limited pathology services for 
members of the UBMC medical staff in Dr. Alfred's absence. (R.189, 545.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it held that the UBMC Board properly terminated 
the Agreement with Dr. Hardy on July 18, 1996. Not only was the Agreement 
fully enforceable against the Board holding office in 1996 because the Agreement 
did not violate the rule of law holding certain contracts entered into with 
governmental bodies are not binding on successors, but it was also enforceable 
because the Board ratified its terms. Thus, this Court should enter an order 
reversing the trial court's ruling which granted summary judgment in favor of 
UBMC. 
As an initial matter, the trial court improperly applied the two-part test in 
Bair v. Layton City Corp., 307 P.2d 895 (Utah 1957), the case which was 
controlling on the issue of whether Dr. Hardy's Agreement impermissibly bound 
UBMC's successor boards of trustees. Rather than consider whether the contract 
at issue involved a governmental or proprietary function (as Bair requires), the trial 
court reviewed the nature of the UBMC Board. Having concluded that the Board 
was a "governmental entity," the trial court erroneously determined that the 
Agreement was voidable by successor boards. The trial court's analysis is at odds 
with Utah case law and results in a flawed ruling. This result is not entirely 
surprising because the governmental/proprietary test articulated by Bair is 
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confusing and difficult to apply. Accordingly, this Court should adopt a test that 
properly takes into account the policy for the rule. Under such an analysis, the 
Agreement clearly would be enforceable because it in no way restricts or hinders 
the Board in its policy-making decisions. 
Although Bair is controlling authority on the issue of whether a government 
contract impermissibly binds successors, Bair is inapposite in this case because the 
policy underlying the law does not apply. First, the UBMC Board is an appointed, 
rather than an elected board. Second, the Agreement is essentially an employment 
contract made in good faith. Under well-recognized law, such contracts are 
generally enforceable against successor boards. Additionally, there is no 
"successor" board in this case because the terms of the UBMC Board members are 
staggered. To the contrary, the Board is a continuous body, free to enter into long-
term contracts which benefit the community. Finally, the Agreement does not 
impermissibly bind successor boards because, pursuant to its terms, the Agreement 
was terminable for "just cause." 
Should this Court find, however, that the Agreement was voidable by future 
boards—either under the governmental/proprietary test or under another test 
adopted by the Court—it should nonetheless hold that the Agreement is 
enforceable because the UBMC Board holding office in 1996 was not a 
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"successor" board. Such a ruling would be consistent with the case law since a 
new board is not created until a majority of the members of the board are replaced. 
In this case, between the time the Board entered into the Agreement with Dr. 
Hardy and the time it terminated that Agreement, only three of the ten board 
members were newly appointed. 
Finally, even if this Court finds that the Agreement was voidable and that 
the UBMC Board holding office in 1996 was a successor board, it should reverse 
the trial court's ruling that the Agreement was properly terminated. By treating the 
Agreement as valid and accepting the benefits of Dr. Hardy's pathology services 
from the time the new board was seated in January of 1996 through July of 1996, 
the UBMC Board implicitly ratified the Agreement. It was not entitled to 
terminate the contract until January of 1997, when a new member would be 
appointed to the UBMC Board. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER THE BAIR TEST, DR. HARDY'S AGREEMENT 
IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE. 
In holding that the Agreement was voidable by the UBMC Board, the trial 
court relied upon a seldom-cited rule of law which states that in performing 
governmental, as opposed to proprietary functions, municipal boards may not enter 
into contracts which are binding on the municipality after the end of the board's 
11 
term of office. (Ruling at 2, Addendum.) With little analysis, the trial court 
concluded that because the UBMC Board is a "goveramental entity," it was unable 
to enter into the Agreement, the terms of which potentially would bind all 
successor boards. (Id.) The trial court's ruling, which failed to discuss or take 
note of the fact that the Agreement related to a proprietary function of the Board 
rather than a goveramental function, was plainly in error.1 
Almost fifty years ago in Bair, 307 P.2d at 902, this Court adopted the 
governmental/proprietary test for determining whether a municipal contract is 
enforceable against successors of the goveramental entity.2 In Bair, the Court was 
1
 While not entirely clear from the ruling itself, it appears that the trial court 
concluded that the Agreement was voidable because it was entered into by 
UBMC, a governmental entity. (Ruling at 2, Addendum.) Assuming this 
accurately states the trial court's analysis, reversal is clearly warranted because 
the trial court misapplied the law. To determine whether a contract entered into 
with a governmental entity is enforceable, a court must consider whether the 
contract itself involves the performance of the entity's governmental or 
proprietary function. Bair, 307 P.2d at 902. In this case, it appears that the trial 
court instead engaged in an analysis of whether the entity itself (the UBMC 
Board) was a governmental or proprietary entity. (Ruling at 2, Addendum) 
("... [Tjhere should be no reason for such an agreement to continue into the future 
or be binding on successor Boards where the governing Board is a 
governmental entity.") (emphasis added.) Under such an analysis of the law, all 
contracts entered into with municipalities would be voidable at the whim of the 
board. 
2
 The trial court did not cite or analyze the Bair decision in its ruling. However, 
that case established Utah's standard for determining whether a contract entered 
into by a municipality is enforceable against its successors. Thus, Bair was 
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asked to determine whether a 50-year contract for sewage treatment was valid and 
enforceable. Id. at 897. In deciding that the contract was enforceable, the Bair 
Court acknowledged the common law rule that "governing bodies, in the exercise 
of governmental or legislative power cannot make a contract which is binding on 
the municipality after the end of such governing body's term of office." Id. at 902. 
However, the Court recognized that "in the exercise of its business or proprietary 
power such body may bind the municipality for as long a period of time as is 
reasonably necessary to accomplish a legal purpose." Id. Thus, under Bair, the 
first step in determining whether a long-term municipal contract is enforceable is 
to determine whether the contract involves a governmental or proprietary function. 
If the function is governmental, then the contract is not enforceable against 
successors. On the other hand, if the contract involves a proprietary function, the 
contract is enforceable only if it passes the second part of the Bair test—whether 
its duration is reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 902. 
The trial court failed to follow the two-part analysis set forth in Bair. The 
first step in Bair requires determining whether the subject matter of the contract 
involves a governmental or proprietary function. The trial court, however, focused 
binding on the trial court and any discussion of the trial court's ruling must begin 
with an analysis and application of Bair. 
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on the fact that a party to the contract—UBMC—was a governmental entity, and 
concluded that because UBMC is a governmental entity, the Agreement was 
voidable. (Ruling at 2, Addendum.) Under Bair, the trial court should have 
analyzed whether the Agreement to provide pathology services satisfied a 
governmental or proprietary function of the Board. 
A. The Agreement Satisfies a Proprietary Function of the Board. 
Unfortunately, Bair simply offers no guidance on how Utah courts should 
make the determination of whether a municipal contract involves a governmental 
or proprietary function. The Bair court concluded sewage treatment contracts are 
proprietary without analysis, citing other jurisdictions that had so held. Bair, 307 
P.2d at 902. Other jurisdictions, however have adopted useful factors to consider 
in making this determination.3 Courts frequently consider whether the municipal 
board's discretion or policy-making authority is hampered by the contract; if not, 
3
 Utah appellate courts have developed criteria for determining whether a function 
is governmental or proprietary in the context of tort immunity. See, e.g. Debry v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 439 (Utah 1995) (reviewing and summarizing Utah case law 
on governmental/proprietary test in tort immunity context). The tort immunity test, 
however, does not work well in analyzing municipal contracts because the policy 
considerations are vastly different. See Janice C. Griffith, Local Government 
Contracts: Escaping) from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWAL. REV. 
277, 327-28 (1990) ("The risk that courts will confuse the interests that activate the 
distinct tests [for tort immunity and for municipal contracts] argues against use of 
the same general rubric in different contexts."). 
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the contract involves a proprietary function and is enforceable. See, e.g., Rhode 
Island Student Loan Auth. v. Nels, Inc., 550 A.2d 624, 627 (R.I. 1988) (in which 
the court found the contract at issue to be proprietary because the contracting party 
"could neither exercise discretion nor set policy in the performance of its duties"). 
Courts also often consider a contract proprietary if the agreement benefits the 
people whom the governmental entity serves. See, e.g., Daly v. Stokell, 63 So.2d 
644, 645 (Fla. 1953) ("We understand the test of a proprietary power to be 
determined by whether or not the agents of the city act and contract for the benefit 
and welfare of its people; any contract, in other words, that redounds to the public 
or individual advantage and welfare of the city or its people is proprietary..."). 
Other factors that indicate a contract is proprietary include whether the activity can 
be performed by a private entity and whether the contract is entered into to raise 
revenue. See, e.g., Chichester Sch. Dist. v. ChichesterEduc. Ass'n, 750 A.2d 400, 
403 n.l 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). Contracts are considered to involve a 
governmental function, on the other hand, if the function is "indispensable to the 
proper functioning of government," id., or involves exercising "some element of 
sovereignty." Daly, 63 So.2d at 645. 
Under these factors, Dr. Hardy's contract is a proprietary contract. First, and 
mostly importantly, Dr. Hardy's contract does not impair the UBMC Board of 
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Trustees' ability to exercise its policymaking role, as the Agreement itself 
demonstrates. The Agreement provides, in pertinent part, that in addition to 
reviewing pathology specimens, Dr. Hardy would: 
• be available for physician consults to interpret laboratory results; 
• visit the UBMC hospital weekly for one to two hours to recommend 
processes and policies to assure smooth operation of the UBMC 
laboratory; and 
• undertake teaching activities when new procedures were introduced. 
(Agreement at 1-2, Addendum.) By and large, Dr. Hardy was responsible for 
making pathologic diagnoses. While in addition, Dr. Hardy suggested medical 
"policies" for correcting technical and administrative problems, such "policies" are 
not the sort of policymaking that must be left to a governing body. Moreover, the 
Agreement simply requires Dr. Hardy to recommend policies for fixing any 
problems that may arise in the pathology lab he directs at UBMC. Even if these 
policies were viewed as the kind of legislative policymaking that should not be 
taken from UBMC Boards, Dr. Hardy's contract is still enforceable because as 
director of pathology, Dr. Hardy merely makes suggestions. Under the terms of 
the Agreement, the Board continues to formulate and adopt policies for the 
pathology lab and the hospital as a whole. Further, if Dr. Hardy ever failed to 
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implement UBMC policies, then UBMC could terminate the Agreement pursuant 
to the "just cause" provision. 
Second, the contract does "redound to the public" advantage because the 
people of the Uintah Basin benefit from having pathology services performed by 
Dr. Hardy. Certainly UBMC entered into the contract for the very purpose of 
providing quality medical services to the patients of the hospital. 
Third, the contract does not involve a function that is "indispensable" to the 
functioning of a government or "an element of sovereignty." This contract was 
simply for pathology services, which by no stretch of the imagination can be 
deemed an essential aspect of government. 
And finally, Dr. Hardy's services bring money into UBMC rather than require 
expenditure of tax dollars. Dr. Hardy bills patients for his services, retains a 
portion as part of his fee and UBMC retains the remainder of funds collected. 
(Agreement at 1-2, Addendum.) Further, the provision of pathology services not 
only "may be carried on by private enterprise," but it most often is. Chichester, 750 
A.2d at 403 n.l 1. Private physicians, not governments, operate pathology 
laboratories, even, as in this case, if the laboratory is for a county hospital. 
17 
B. The Agreement is for a Reasonable Duration. 
Under these factors, Dr. Hardy's contract is proprietary, not governmental. 
As such, it is enforceable under Bair if it meets the second element of the test— 
that is, if it is deemed to be for a reasonable duration. Bair, 307 P.2d at 902. In 
determining whether the contract was for a reasonable duration, the Bair Court 
quoted with approval the analysis in McBean v. City of Fresno, 44 P. 358 (Cal. 
1896): 
In sustaining such [sewage treatment] contract, the court 
said that if "it be made to appear that at the time the 
contract was entered into, it was fair and just and 
reasonable, and prompted by the necessities of the 
situation, or was in its nature advantageous to the 
municipality, then such contract will not be construed as 
an unreasonable restraint upon the powers of succeeding 
boards." This, we believe, is a clear and correct 
statement of the law on this question . . . . 
Bair, 307 P.2d at 902-03 (quoting McBean, 44 P. at 361).4 Thus, in the event that 
the proprietary contract at issue is fair, just and reasonable and prompted by the 
necessities of the situation, the contract must be held valid and enforceable even if 
it extends beyond the terms of the members of the governmental entity. 
4
 As discussed in section IIA, infra, Bair is rather difficult to decipher. An 
argument can be made that Bair intended the McBean factors to be used for 
determining whether a contract is proprietary or governmental. If this Court does 
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Under this second step of the Bair test, the trial court should have held the 
Agreement is enforceable. First, the Agreement was fair and reasonable when 
UBMC entered into it. As the Agreement states, either party could terminate it 
"for just cause." (Agreement at 1, Addendum.) The "just cause" provision in the 
Agreement not only provided Dr. Hardy with security,5 it also ensured that UBMC 
would always have quality pathology services, since the "just cause" provision 
would allow the Board to terminate the Agreement if Dr. Hardy's services ever 
became inadequate. Second, the Agreement was prompted by "the necessities of 
the situation." Bair, 307 P.2d at 902. As the Agreement recites, the arrangement 
met "the needs of Uintah Basin Medical Center" at the time it was executed. 
(Agreement at 1, Addendum.) 
In addition to meeting UBMC's essential need for a pathologist, the duration 
of the contract—the occurrence of "just cause"—was necessary to ensure UBMC 
would have continuous, quality pathology services. These hospitals have a great 
need to hire and retain quality physicians, and often such hospitals offer additional 
not abolish Bair as urged in section II, then the Court should clarify for trial 
courts how Bair should be applied. 
5
 Dr. Hardy was assured that he would be terminated only for "just cause" and not 
for any indiscriminate reason for which an at will employee could be let go. 
(Agreement at 1, Addendum.) 
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job security to induce physicians to stay in rural practice. Rural hospitals are 
already at a disadvantage in attracting high quality health care providers because 
they simply cannot match the salaries offered in larger communities. According to 
the Journal of the American Medical Association: 
[0]ne of the most persistent and serious problems facing 
the US physician work-force [is] the shortage of 
physicians in rural areas. Constituting more than 20% of 
the US population, rural areas contain one of the largest 
medically underserved populations in the country. Rural 
areas have more primary care Health Professional 
Shortage Areas (HPSAs)...than nonrural areas. While 
this shortage of physicians in rural areas is not new, it 
appears to be worsening despite the large and increasing 
number of physicians being trained in this country. 
Moreover, recent data that few medical school graduates 
(2.2%) plan to practice in rural areas or small towns raise 
serious questions as to whether this is likely to improve 
in the future. 
Howard K. Rabinowitz, et al., A Program to Increase the Number of Family 
Physicians in Rural and Underserved Areas, Journal of the American Medical 
Association, Jan 1999. 
Although the trial court noted the problems facing rural hospitals, its concern did 
not factor into the decision. (Ruling at 2, Addendum) ("Perhaps this is one of the 
reasons why the rural hospitals in the Country are going private rather than 
remaining under the control of the governmental entities that had traditionally 
operated them; other wise [sic], their ability to recruit good Doctors' [sic] would 
be severely limited.") 
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To entice excellent physicians to move to and remain in rural areas such as 
the Uintah Basin, hospitals often add perks to the contracts, including "just cause" 
termination provisions, or even offer "lifetime" contracts.7 The Florida courts and 
legislature have already recognized the importance of retaining qualified 
employees to perform work for municipalities or counties. "[W]e recognize the 
best way to get the best people to do their best job is to treat them right, pay them 
well and offer them security in their employment." Tweed v. City of Cape 
Canaveral, 373 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979). Given the necessities of the 
situation, such contracts are of a reasonable duration. Thus, the Agreement passes 
the second part of the Bair test as well. 
When the two-step Bair analysis is properly applied, the Agreement is 
unquestionably enforceable. However, as noted above, the Bair test is difficult to 
decipher and even more difficult to apply, since it offers no guidance for 
determining the governmental/proprietary function. While the parties have the 
luxury on appeal of carefully examining and explicating the Bair test and applying 
it to the facts in the case, they often do not have such an opportunity in the trial 
court below. In the instant case, for example, the parties did not brief the 
governmental/proprietary issue until after summary judgment oral argument. 
7
 Indeed, UBMC has a "lifetime" contract with at least one physician. 
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(R.991-1018.) Like most trial courts, the Roosevelt court doubtless had little time 
to analyze the cases and issue its written decision. These time pressures—coupled 
with the fact that the Bair test is difficult to decode and to apply—mean that trial 
courts will likely continue to misapply or misinterpret Utah law on long-term 
municipal contracts. Thus, Dr. Hardy asks this Court to adopt a clearer, more 
workable test to better guide the trial court if a remand is necessary. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT A TEST FOR DETERMINING 
WHETHER MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS ARE ENFORCEABLE 
THAT PROPERLY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE POLICY FOR 
THE RULE. 
This Court should recognize that the governmental/proprietary test, which 
Bair adopted, is too difficult to apply, and adopt a more straightforward test that 
takes into account the policy for prohibiting long-term municipal contracts. 
A. The Governmental/Proprietary Test Is Unworkable. 
The common law rule that a municipality may not enter into a contract that 
binds its successors in office was created in the early 19th century because courts 
recognized that a legislative body must be free to enact policy as changing needs— 
and the electorate - dictate. See Griffith, Escaping the Maze, at 282-83. Courts 
quickly recognized, however, that municipalities need to enter into long-term 
contracts to operate efficiently, and ultimately the "governmental/proprietary" test 
was adopted for determining whether a long-term municipal contract would be 
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enforceable. Id. at 302 & n.133. As discussed above, under this test, a municipal 
entity may enter into a long-term contract that would bind future officials elected 
to run the municipality if the contract involves a proprietary, rather than a 
govermnental, function. Id. at 303-04. 
The problem with the governmental/proprietary test is that it simply does not 
work. "There is no precise dividing line between the two functions; they may 
sometimes be difficult of distinction and may tend to overlap." Daly, 63 So.2d at 
645. See also Valvano v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Union, 
183 A.2d 450, 451-52 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1962) (the governmental/proprietary 
dichotomy is universally recognized, but not uniformly applied because "[t]he 
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is not easy to 
decipher"). As a leading commentator on the subject explained, "the most 
common criticism of the governmental/proprietary test is that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to apply." Griffith, Escaping the Maze, at 322 (emphasis added); see 
also Figuly v. City of Douglas, 853 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Wyo. 1994) (test results 
in illogical or inconsistent results); Piedmont Public Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 459 
S.E.2d 876, 881 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he difference between proprietary and 
governmental functions is often difficult to determine, because, as the scope of 
govemmentality expands, the intertwining and overlapping of such functions make 
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it increasingly more difficult to draw any definitive line of separation.") (citation 
and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, as early as 1955 Justice Frankfurter 
described the test as the "quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal 
corporations." Indian Towing Co. v. U.S., 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955). Today, with 
governmental entities either taking on more business activities or privatizing 
activities that had previously been the domain of government, the test is not so 
much a quagmire as it is an anachronism. 
In fact, this Court in Bair struggled with the governmental/proprietary 
distinction and ultimately adopted McLean's "clear and correct statement of the 
law" regarding enforceability of long-term municipal contracts. Bair, 307 P.2d at 
902. McBean itself, however, expressly declined to adopt the 
governmental/proprietary test. Rather, McBean adopted the test of whether the 
contract is "fair and just and reasonable, and prompted by the necessities of the 
situation," and "advantageous to the municipality" to determine if the contract is 
enforceable. SeeMcBean, 44 P. at 361. Because McBean—which Bair describes 
as providing a "clear and correct statement of the law"—rejected the 
governmental/proprietary test, it is difficult to be certain exactly what the Bair 
court intended when it adopted the McBean factors. Subsequent Utah case law 
does not shed any light on the Bair test. Cf. Salt Lake City v. State, 448 P.2d 350, 
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353 (Utah 1968) (upholding city's argument to perpetually provide water for 
capitol grounds on basis that the "city in selling water is engaged in a proprietary 
activity and not in its governmental capacity" without discussing or citing Baif). 
Recognizing that the governmental/proprietary test cannot do what it was 
originally intended to—that is allow municipalities to enter into beneficial 
contracts that will not impede governments' powers—many jurisdictions have 
abandoned it in favor of more workable tests. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ass 'nfor the 
Preservation ofTenn. Antiquities v. City of Jackson, 573 S. W.2d 750 (Tenn. 1978) 
(rejecting governmental/proprietary distinction and adopting 3-part test for 
determining whether long-term contracts with municipality are enforceable); Plant 
Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 199 S.E. 712 (N.C. 1938); Mariano & Assoc, v. 
Board of County Comm 'rs of Sublette County, 737 P.2d 323, 327-28 (Wyo. 1987); 
McBean, 44 P. at 361 (municipal contract enforceable against successors if it was 
fair, just, reasonable, and necessary at the time it was executed). This Court should 
also recognize that the governmental/proprietary test is unworkable and outmoded 
and adopt a more workable test. 
B. This Court Should Adopt a Test That Focuses on the Underlying 
Policy of Barring Long-Term Municipal Contracts. 
In adopting a test to replace the governmental/proprietary test, this Court 
should bear in mind the very compelling policy reasons for prohibiting 
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municipalities from binding their successors to contracts as well as for allowing 
exceptions. As one court recently explained: 
. . . the doctrine here at issue has its roots in our 
fundamental notions of democratic government. We 
select public officials, legislative or executive, whom we 
believe will carry out the policies intended by the 
electorate. If they fail to do so, or if the people conclude 
that new policies are in order, they can be voted out of 
office. To allow an elected body to perpetuate its 
policies beyond its term of office would frustrate the 
ability of the citizenry to exercise its will at the ballot 
box. It is only because of these fundamental concerns 
that we allow otherwise valid contracts to be undone, and 
we must carefully evaluate each case to insure that 
innocent third parties are not unnecessarily harmed for 
the sake of democratic principals. As noted long ago by 
another court, "the true test is whether the contract 
itself deprives a governing body, or its successor, of a 
discretion which public policy demands should be left 
unimpaired." 
Lobolito, Inc. v. North Pocono Sch. Dist, 111 A.2d 249, 252-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1998) (emphasis added), rev'don other grounds, 755 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 2000) 
(quoting Plant Food, 199 S.E. at 714 ) (emphasis added). Without expressly 
adopting a new test, the Lobolito court distilled the Plant Food test into what it 
called the "essential inquiry:" "whether enforcement of the contract would impair, 
to any significant degree, the new body's exercise of its policymaking role." Id. at 
252. Although this modified Plant Food test may be subject to criticism as "too 
inexact," application of the test is actually straightforward. See Griffith, Escaping 
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the Maze at 335 (criticizing the Plant Food test). It has the advantage of focusing 
on the reason governments generally should not enter into long-term contracts. 
Under the modified Plant test, Dr. Hardy's contract is enforceable against 
UBMC successor boards. As detailed in section IA, supra, Dr. Hardy's contract 
does not impair the UBMC Board of Trustees' ability to exercise its policymaking 
role. Dr. Hardy only suggests medical "policies," which does not involve the sort 
of legislative policymaking identified in the modified Plant Food test. (Agreement 
at 1, Addendum.) Under the very terms of the Agreement, the Board continues to 
formulate policies for the pathology lab. And, if Dr. Hardy ever failed to 
implement UBMC policies, then UBMC could terminate the Agreement pursuant 
to the "just cause" provision. Because Dr. Hardy's Agreement does not in any way 
impair future UBMC Boards from formulating and adopting policies, this Court 
should find it is enforceable. 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, and the analysis in section I, supra, 
deciding whether a contract should properly be enforced against a government's 
successors is not difficult when the focus is on the "critical issue" of whether the 
contract prevents an elected official from doing what he or she was elected to do— 
enact policy. Even if this Court declines to abolish the governmental/proprietary 
distinction, it should at least adopt the policymaking test as a factor in making the 
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governmental/proprietary distinction. The trial court below, and future trial courts, 
will certainly benefit from this more precise inquiry. 
III. THE RULE PROHIBITING LONG-TERM MUNICIPAL 
CONTRACTS DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE 
UNDERLYING POLICY IS NOT IMPLICATED UNDER THE 
PARTICULAR FACTS. 
Although the trial court apparently reached its decision based upon Bair, the 
policy underlying the rule that government officials should not be allowed to 
contract beyond their term of office does not apply in this case for at least four 
reasons. Accordingly, this Court should rule the Agreement is exempt from the 
Bair rule. First, UBMC Board members are appointed, not elected. Second, Dr. 
Hardy's contract is essentially an employment contract, and under established law, 
such a contract may bind successor boards. Third, UBMC's Board is staggered 
such that there is never a "future" board to be impermissibly bound, and, fourth the 
"just cause" provision in the Agreement allows future Boards to terminate the 
contract for legitimate reasons so that future Boards are not impermissibly bound. 
A. UBMC's Appointed Board Does Not Answer Directly to the 
Electorate and Therefore the Policy Underlying the Prohibition 
Against Binding Successors Does Not Come Into Play. 
The UBMC Board of Trustees is not an elected body. Instead, members are 
appointed by the Duchesne County Commissioners and serve a minimum three 
year term, irrespective of whether the County Commissioners who appointed the 
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board members remain in office for the duration of those board members' tenure. 
(UBMC Hospital Bylaws at 1-2, Addendum.) This is a critical fact completely 
overlooked by the trial court. 
Courts have prevented successor boards from being bound by the actions of 
predecessors because an elected official should be entitled to execute the platform 
upon which he or she was elected. This rationale is worth repeating, this time in 
the words of the Wyoming federal court: 
One of the most important characteristics of our 
democratic form of government is the authority of our 
elected officials to make changes mandated by the 
electorate. The ability of incoming officials to change 
policies, procedures, and even key personnel of their 
predecessors, allows the incoming officials to implement 
their own policies, those policies desired by the majority 
of the public who elected them. To allow a prior 
government or official to bind his successors by creating 
contracts or other commitments which extend beyond his 
term would be contrary to this critical facet of 
democracy. 
Figuly, 853 F. Supp. at 384. If the elected official were compelled to honor all 
contracts executed by his or her predecessor, he or she would be unable to 
implement any policies or promises made during a campaign. Running for office 
would be a difficult task indeed if the official could not effectuate any changes. 
The same logic does not apply to appointed boards. Members of an 
appointed board are not chosen by the ballot. If the appointed board member is 
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appointed by an elected official, the board member's term can, and often does, 
extend well beyond the term of the elected official. The appointed board member 
is thus not duty-bound to uphold the policies of the elected official who appointed 
him or her. Based upon this reasoning, the court in Airport Impact Relief, Inc. v. 
Massachusetts Port Auth., 1995 WL 809553 * 7 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995)8 
concluded that a contract entered into by an appointed board which exceeded the 
tenure of some of the members of the board was not voidable, but rather was a 
fully enforceable contract. "The board in the instant case is not an elected board as 
it was in Dracut, but a staggered and appointed one." Id. There is simply no 
compelling reason to extend this rule of law to contracts entered into by appointed 
boards. See also Board of Klamath County Comm 'rs v. Select County Employees, 
939 P.2d 80, 84 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) ("When a majority of the members of a 
governing body must stand for election at the same time, we follow the 
established rule that prohibits an outgoing governing body from binding a 
succeeding governing body to a contract that calls for the performance of 
governmental functions.") (emphasis added); City of Hazel Park v. Potter, 426 
8
 Dr. Hardy recognizes that the Airport Impact case is an unpublished opinion 
under Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-508. Accordingly, Dr. Hardy has filed 
contemporaneously herewith a Motion to Cite Unpublished Decision. This 
motion is based upon the paucity of published decisions which address this issue 
necessitating a review of relevant unpublished decisions. 
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N.W.2d 789, 793 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (rule applies to elected board); Tryon v. 
Avra Valley Fire Dist., 659 F. Supp. 283 (D. Ariz. 1986) (same); Labor Relations 
Comm 'n v. Board of Selectmen ofDracut, 373 N.E.2d 1165, 1167 (Mass. 1978) 
(same). 
Because the UBMC Board was appointed, (R.1027), the ban against long-
term municipal contracts does not apply. Empowering the UBMC Board to enter 
into contracts which extend beyond the term of any one of the board members does 
not threaten the electoral process. The Uintah Basin community remains free to 
elect officials to carry out certain platforms the community desires. 
B. Because Dr. Hardy's Agreement is Essentially an Employment 
Contract and Made in Good Faith, it is Enforceable Against 
Successor Boards. 
The rule banning long-term municipal contracts also does not apply in this 
case because Dr. Hardy's Agreement is essentially an employment contract, and it 
has long been recognized that such contracts do not implicate the underlying policy 
of the rule. " . . . a contract of employment extending beyond the term of the office 
of the members of a public board, such as a board of county commissioners, a 
municipal board, or other similar controlling body representing a municipal 
corporation, is, if made in good faith, ordinarily a valid contract." 10A Eugene 
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.101, p. 45 (3d ed. 1999). 
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Only when "the nature of an office or employment is such that it requires a 
municipal board or officer to exercise supervisory control over the appointee or 
employee, together with the power of removal" will the appointment be considered 
a governmental function, and the contract voidable by successor boards. Id. at p. 
46. In other words, if the contract is for an employee working directly for the 
board and helping the board implement policy, the contract is voidable by future 
boards. Otherwise, it is a legitimate, enforceable contract: 
Where the [employment] contract in question is a unitary 
one for the doing of a particular and specified act, but its 
performance may extend beyond the term of the officers 
making it, if it appears that the contract was made in 
good faith and in the public interest it is not void because 
it will not be completed during the term of those officers. 
If, on the other hand, the contract is for the performance 
of personal or professional services for employing 
officers, their successors must be allowed to choose for 
themselves those persons on whose honesty, skill and 
ability they must rely. 
Tryon, 659 F. Supp. at 285 (citation omitted). 
Because Dr. Hardy's Agreement is essentially an employment contract made 
in good faith, and because Dr. Hardy was neither supervised by nor worked 
directly for the Board, his contract is valid. Pursuant to his contract, Dr. Hardy 
was the director of the pathology lab at UBMC. {See Agreement, Addendum at 2.) 
9
 UBMC has never alleged the contract was not entered into in good faith. 
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He was not supervised by the Board, but rather reported to the UBMC medical 
staff. To maintain clinical privileges at UBMC, Dr. Hardy had to be appointed to 
the medical staff. (See UBMC Hospital Bylaws at 6, Addendum.) The medical 
staff has "the responsibility and authority to investigate and evaluate all matters 
relating [to] the Medical Staff membership status (including appointment and 
reappointment)." (Id. at 7.) Thus, the medical staff, not the Board, directly 
supervised Dr. Hardy and evaluated whether Dr. Hardy should be allowed to 
continue to practice at UBMC. (See, e.g., R.991, in which Dr. Hardy informs staff 
of new pathology systems.) Under the employment contract exception, the 
contract between UBMC and Dr. Hardy is valid and enforceable. 
C. Because UBMC's Board is Staggered, There is No "Successor" 
Board. 
Additionally, the prohibition against long-term municipal contracts does not 
apply in this case because UBMC's Board is staggered. Without analysis, the trial 
court rejected this argument. (Ruling at 2, Addendum.) However, the staggered 
board exception is recognized in treatises and case law as preventing application of 
the rule against long-term municipal contracts because there is never a "future" 
board to be impermissibly bound. 
"Where a municipal body is a board or commission, the terms of the 
members of which are staggered, it is a continuous body, existing in perpetuity; 
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and contracts of such a body generally do not bind or restrict successors in office." 
10A McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 29.101. Courts, as well as McQuillin, have 
recognized the "staggered board" rule, and have upheld contracts entered into by 
such boards. In Airport Impact Relief 1995 WL 809553 * 6-7,10 the court held that 
the rule prohibiting successors from being bound to a contract did not apply. "The 
court is not persuaded by Massport's argument that the agreement is unenforceable 
on its face because it binds 'future' Massport boards. The staggered terms 
provision was plainly intended to ensure the board's continuous, perpetual 
existence." Id. at *6. The Florida Supreme Court also recognized that common 
sense dictates that a staggered, continuous board never has a "future" embodiment 
to be impermissibly bound: 
We find no merit to the contention that the contract is 
invalid and unenforceable because it runs beyond the 
length of term of the city commissioners. It is shown that 
their terms are staggered and expire at different times. 
When this is the case, the City commission is a 
continuing body and may contract for any reasonable 
time since there is no point at which the terms of all the 
commissioners come to an end. 
Daly, 63 So.2d at 645. See alsoManley v. Scott, 121 N.W. 628, 630 (Minn. 1909) 
("Having the power at that time to employ a morgue keeper, there is no implied 
limitation upon that power which restricts the possible term of employment to the 
10
 See supra n. 8. 
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time when any member or members of the board shall go out of office."); St. Louis 
Police Officers'Assoc, v. Board of Police Comm 'rs, 846 S.W.2d 732, 739 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1992) (five-member board held to be a "continuous body" when one 
appointed member occupied a seat on the board throughout the relevant period); 
Aslin v. Stoddard County, 106 S.W.2d472, 476 (Mo. 1937) (courthouse janitor's 
contract with the county court held to bind the county despite the fact that it 
extended beyond the terms of some of the members of the court). 
UBMC's Bylaws dictate such a staggered or "continuous" board: 
The Board of Trustees shall consist of nine (9) voting 
members, seven of which are appointed elected [sic] for 
three (3) year [sic]. Board members are eligible to fill a 
maximum of two consecutive three (3) year terms. 
(UBMC Hospital Bylaws at 1-2, Addendum.) Under this structure, some Board 
members will serve two consecutive three-year terms while others might serve 
only one term, thus creating overlap between new and incumbent Board members. 
Moreover, three of the positions created by the Bylaws—the appointed member of 
the Duchesne County Commission, the Chief of the Medical Staff and the Hospital 
Administrator—have no limit, thereby creating three board positions of indefinite 
duration and increasing the possibility of overlapping boards. (Id.) 
In fact, between 1994 and 1996, the years Dr. Hardy was appointed to the 
medical staff and the year he was terminated, respectively, only three of the ten 
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board members completed their terms. (R. 1026-27.) The remaining seven board 
members remained in office. (Id.) As a result of the appointment mechanisms 
created by the County, UBMC's Board "is a continuous body, existing in 
perpetuity." 10A McQuillin Municipal Corp. § 29.100. As a continuous body, the 
UBMC Board was empowered to enter into contracts even if the term of the 
contract had the potential to extend beyond the term of some of its members. 
D. The Board's Successors are Not Impermissibly Bound bv the 
Agreement Because Successor Boards Could Always Terminate 
the Agreement for "Just Cause" 
Finally, the Agreement was terminable for "just cause" upon 90 days notice 
at any time after the contract was executed. (See Agreement at 1, Addendum.) 
Thus, any successor board could terminate the contract if it had "just cause" to do 
so and the prohibition against binding the hands of successor boards simply does 
not apply. See, e.g., In reAverback v. Board of Educ. , 541 N.Y.S.2d 655, 657 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (rejecting argument that teacher's contract impermissibly 
bound successor school board in part because "[t]he agreement permits a successor 
board to discharge petitioner for cause during the probationary term" of her 
employment). Similarly, if Dr. Hardy failed to fulfill his contractual obligations, 
or became unable to meet the needs of the community, UBMC would have had 
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"just cause" to terminate the contract. Because of the "just cause" provision, Dr. 
Hardy's Agreement does not impermissibly bind "future" UBMC Boards. 
IV. IF THIS COURT RULES DR. HARDY'S AGREEMENT WAS 
VOIDABLE BY FUTURE BOARDS, IT SHOULD HOLD THAT A 
"NEW" BOARD WAS NOT CREATED UNTIL A MAJORITY OF 
MEMBERS WERE REPLACED. 
For the reasons discussed above, this Court should hold that Dr. Hardy's 
contract is not voidable as a contract that impermissibly binds successor UBMC 
Boards. However, if this Court should rule otherwise, it also must address the 
question of when, exactly, a new board is created. The trial court ruled that because 
there were three new members on the UBMC Board when it voted to terminate the 
Agreement in July 1996, the Board was a "new" Board and entitled to void the 
Agreement. (Ruling at 2, Addendum.) Although the trial court did not explain the 
basis for this conclusion, presumably it concluded that once a single new member 
was appointed to the Board, the Board was "new" and entitled to void any contract 
made by a "predecessor" board. This Court should reject the trial court's legal 
conclusion that a "new" board is created when a single new member is added and 
hold that a "new" Board is not created until at least of majority of the members are 
replaced. 
At least one recent case has recognized that the rule preventing future 
government boards from being bound is not implicated unless a majority of board 
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members are replaced. In Klamath County, 939 P.2d at 84, the court stated: 
"When a majority of the members of a governing body must stand for election at 
the same time, we follow the established rule that prohibits the outgoing body from 
binding a succeeding governing body to a contract that calls for the performance of 
governmental functions." (emphasis added) (citing Miles v. City of Baker, 51 P.2d 
1047 (1935), which applied rule when all three members of board stood for 
reelection at one time and two were defeated; 28 Or. Atty. Gen. Op. 3846 (1957), 
concluding that the rule would apply where terms of office for five out of seven 
members of board would expire during term of contract). Applied to UBMC's 
staggered, appointed board, the rule as described in Klamath would allow a board 
that had a majority of new members to void contracts made by predecessor boards. 
Such a rule would fairly limit staggered government boards' ability to disavow 
contracts whenever a new member is appointed. 
If, on the other hand, a "new" UBMC Board, for example, is created any 
time a single new member is appointed, then no one could enter into a contract 
with UBMC with any confidence that it would be enforceable. As detailed in 
Section IIIC, supra, UBMC's Boards are staggered. There are seven members of 
the Board who serve terms. (UBMC Hospital Bylaws at 1, Addendum.) Because 
the members are appointed at differing times, and their terms expire at varying 
38 
times, in virtually every year at least one Board member is replaced. (R. 1026-27.) 
Thus, a physician could enter into a two-year contract with UBMC in August of 
2000, for example, and the following January 1, 2001, a new Board member is 
appointed. The Board could then void the two-year contract with impunity. 
Such a result is not desirable for UBMC, the physicians who enter into 
contracts to provide critical services to the hospital, or to the community. If 
physicians cannot be confident that the contracts they enter into with UBMC are 
legally enforceable beyond a few months, then it is not too far-fetched to reason 
that many physicians would simply choose not to provide services for UBMC.11 
A rule of law which would make UBMC contracts virtually illusory is poor 
policy. Ultimately, the people served by the hospital lose the most, because if 
UBMC cannot recruit and retain excellent health care providers, it cannot maintain 
quality services. Accordingly, if this Court rules that UBMC could not bind 
"future" boards to Dr. Hardy's contract, then this Court should clarify that a 
"future" board is not created until a majority of new members are appointed. 
11
 See supra section IB for a discussion on the difficulties rural hospitals face in 
retaining quality health providers. 
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V. IN ANY EVENT, THE BOARD IMPROPERLY TERMINATED DR. 
HARDY'S AGREEMENT BECAUSE IN 1996, THE BOARD 
RATIFIED THE AGREEMENT. 
If this Court finds that the trial court correctly determined that the UBMC 
Board in 1996 was a newly constituted board, it should find that the 1996 Board 
actually ratified Dr. Hardy's contract. The trial court ruled that because there were 
tliree new members on the 1996 Board, the Board properly terminated Dr. Hardy's 
contract on July 18, 1996. (Ruling at 2, Addendum.) However, by treating Dr. 
Hardy's contract as valid from January of 1996, when a new member was 
appointed to the UBMC Board, through July of 1996, the UBMC Board implicitly 
ratified Dr. Hardy's contract. It was not entitled to terminate his contract until 
January of 1997 when, according to the trial court's ruling, the UBMC Board 
would, once again, be newly constituted due to the addition of a new member. 
As discussed in greater detail above, one of the purposes of the rule that a 
board may not impermissibly bind successor boards is to prevent a successor board 
from being impeded in its efforts to effectuate the policies and platforms upon 
which the board member was elected. {See supra pp. 29-30.)12 However, courts 
12
 In fact, this rule is most often applied in circumstances in which a lame-duck 
board enters into agreements after an election but before the newly-elected board 
members take office. Lobolito, 755 A.2d at 1291. In Chichester School Dist., 
750 A.2d 400, the court noted that "the notion of 'lame-duck' boards normally 
applies in instances of last-minute contracts executed near the end of the board 
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have held that not all contracts terminate upon the completion of the term of the 
board members who made them. Figuly, 853 F. Supp. at 384. Instead, the board 
has the option of continuing those contracts consistent with its goals and it is not 
obligated to honor agreements which it believes contrary to its policies. A 
successor board therefore may ratify any contract entered into by its predecessors. 
Lobolito, 755 A.2d at 1291, n.7; DeKalb County v. GeorgiaPaperstock Co., 174 
S.E2d 884, 887 (Ga. 1970) (long-term contract would be enforceable "by the 
ratification of the contract evidenced by the board accepting the benefits thereof 
during subsequent years.")- The contracts are not automatically void. 
Utah courts most often discuss ratification in the context of agency 
relationships. The analysis is equally applicable in this case where, in essence, the 
UBMC Board which entered into the Agreement was acting as an agent for the 
1996 UBMC Board. "It is well-established under Utah law that 'subsequent 
affirmance by a principal of a contract made on his behalf by one who had at the 
members' terms. Here, the contracts executed between the Board and the CEA 
and CAA were actually ratified by the Board at public hearing approximately two 
years prior to the election and seating of the successor Board members." See also 
Klamath County, 939 P.2d at 81 (contract terminable where predecessor board 
entered into employment agreement after the election of the new board but before 
their term had expired). Dr. Hardy's contract was not such a midnight contract. 
The parties executed the contract in November of 1994 and it was ratified by at 
least one so-called successor board. 
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time neither actual nor apparent authority constitutes a ratification, which in 
general is as effectual as an original authorization.'" Bullock v. State, 966 P.2d 
1215, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Moses v. ArchieMcFarland & Son, 230 
P.2d 571, 573 (Utah 1951)). Ratification need not be express. 
Any conduct which indicates assent by the purported 
principal to become a party to the transaction or which is 
justifiable only if there is ratification is sufficient. Even 
silence with full knowledge of the facts may manifest 
affirmance and thus operate as a ratification. 
Id. (citing Moses, 230 P.2d at 573-74). 
In this case, there is at least a factual dispute as to whether there was 
ratification of the Agreement making summary judgment inappropriate. In January 
of 1996, a new member was appointed to the UBMC Board. (R. 1027.) However, 
rather than terminate the Agreement with Dr. Hardy upon forming what the trial 
court has designated a "successor board," the UBMC Board treated the Agreement 
as valid for over seven months. (R.1054.) Its conduct in treating the Agreement as 
valid and accepting the benefits of Dr. Hardy's pathology services ratified the 
terms of the Agreement. The Agreement was thus only terminable for just cause or 
upon the seating of a new successor board in January of 1997. This analysis is 
consistent with the case law in which successor boards must take action on the 
contract within a relatively short time period after election to the board. See 
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Lobohto, 755 A.2d at 1288 (contract terminated within a month after election of 
new school board); Klamath County, 939 P.2d at 82 (contract terminated "shortly 
after" two new board members took office); Figuly, 853 F. Supp. at 383 ("almost 
immediately" after city council elections took place, the council began to take steps 
to terminate employee's contract); Tryon, 659 F. Supp. 283 (board members 
included termination of employee's contract on meeting agenda two months after 
taking office). 
Having ratified the Agreement by its conduct over a seven-month period 
following the appointment of a "successor board," UBMC was not entitled to 
terminate the Agreement in July of 1996 absent a finding of just cause. 
CONCLUSION 
This case exemplifies the reason the Court needs to review the rule that 
municipalities may not enter into certain contracts which would impermissibly 
bind successor boards. UBMC was not even aware of this rule at the time it 
terminated Dr. Hardy's Agreement or at the time it initiated this litigation. It was 
not until filing its reply memorandum to the second motion for summary judgment 
that UBMC decided to rely upon the rule in any effort to avoid paying damages for 
terminating Dr. Hardy's contract. This court should clarify the Bair decision so 
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that government entities cannot simply void otherwise valid contracts with 
impunity. 
The facts in this case show that Dr. Hardy's Agreement was valid under Bair 
or under any of the well-recognized exceptions to the Bair rule. Accordingly this 
Court should enter an order reversing the trial court's ruling granting summary 
judgment in favor of UBMC. 
DATED this J ^ day of December, 2000. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
John P. Harrington 
Joni J. Jones 
Melissa H. Bailey 
Attorneys for Defendant / Appellant 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
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ADDENDUM 
Trial Court's Ruling (April 6, 2000) 
Order and Judgment Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(May 18,2000) 
Pathology Services Agreement 
UBMC Hospital Bylaws 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DUCHESNE C O U N T Y ^ / 
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH ^ - ; ^ £ # < E E , C L E R O 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D. 
Defendant(s). 




UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER 
and THOMAS J. ALLRED, M.D., 
Counterclaim Defendant 
and Third-Party Defendant. 
I RULING 
I Civil No. 990000109 CV 
I Judge John R. Anderson 
~D£ 
Uintah Basin Medical Center as Plaintiff brought this action in the form of a 
Declaratory Judgment to have the Court determine the effect and status of an 
Agreement between the Center and Dr. Leo Hardy. Dr. Leo Hardy filed a 
Counterclaim and a Third-Party Complaint for damages under the contract and 
for interference of contract against the Third-Party Defendant Thomas J. Allred, 
M.D. 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant have made cross motions for summary 
judgment based upon stipulated facts and further finding by this Court that the 
essential facts necessary to decide the issues were not in dispute. After 
extensive briefing and oral argument on January 20th, 2000, the Court previously 
found that: 
1. Dr. Hardy's contract to provide pathology services was an enforceable 
contract under Utah Law. 
2. The contract was terminable for "just cause". 
3. Whether Plaintiff had "just cause" to terminate the contract would be a 
question for the jury. 
4. The Court allowed further briefing on the question as to whether or not a 
contract of this nature could bind successor Boards. 
The Court has carefully reviewed the supplemental memoranda filed by the 
parties on this last issue. 
The Court concludes that the contract in question is voidable with or 
without "just cause" simply because it could not bind successor Boards. 
There are many policy reasons why a health care provider would contract 
for pathology services such as entered into with the Plaintiff and Dr. Hardy. Due 
to the rapid advance of science, medicine changes and needs of patients there 
should be no reason for such an agreement to continue into the future or be 
binding on successor Boards where the governing Board is a governmental 
entity. * 
The Courts' conclusion is that the Board may terminate the Agreement with 
Dr. Hardy either for just cause and or simply declare the contract voidable 
because it would be invalid through future and or successor Boards. The Court 
rejects the staggered term concept or argument of the Defendant and the Courts' 
conclusion would be that the Agreement was terminated when the Board served 
notice on Dr. Hardy after ninety days. 
In the year the notice of termination was made there had been three new 
appointments and therefore a new Board. It is the Courts' opinion that the "just 
cause" issue therefore becomes moot and will not go to the jury. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiff, Uintah Basin 
Medical Center will be granted as against the Defendant for the reasons set forth 
in its memoranda. See also, Park City Education Association vs. Board of 
Education of the Park City School District. 879 P.2d 267, (Ut. 1994). 
(JJL*U*( jfm U.g-fti.L. P» Queued! ^o (teAy*+ a^ &uU<^ <UAC*~^&<«^ 
Dated this fr day of-Wafoh, 2000/
 y/ _ ^ 
/ /v 
fudge John R. Anderson 
* Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the rural hospitals in the Country 
are going private rather than remaining under the control of the governmental 
entities that had traditionally operated them; other wise, their ability to recruit 
good Doctors' would be severely limited. 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, 
Plaintiff, : 
v. ] 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D. ; 
Defendant. ] 
LEO W. HARDY, M. D., ; 
Counterclaimant and ] 
Third-Party Plaintiff, ] 
V . 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER ; 
and THOMAS J. ALLRED, M.D., ) 
Counterclaim Defendant ] 
and Third-Party Defendant. ] 
) ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
). SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 990000109CV 
) Judge John R. Anderson 
#83873 vl 
On January 20, 2000, the Court, the Honorable John R. Anderson presiding, heard oral 
argument on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The cross motions were submitted upon stipulated facts agreed to by 
both parties. Plaintiff was represented by Blaine J. Benard of Holme, Roberts & Owen LLP. 
Defendant was represented by John P. Harrington and Joni J. Jones of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. 
Third Party Defendant was represented by Clark A. McClellan of McKeachnie, Allred, McClellan 
& Trotter. Following the hearing and at the request of Defendant's counsel, the Court allowed 
further briefing on the question of whether the professional services agreement (the "Agreement") 
between Duchesne County Hospital, dba Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") and Leo W. 
Hardy, M.D. ("Dr. Hardy") impermissibly bound successor boards of a governmental entity and 
was voidable. Having heard oral argument of counsel, considered the cross motions for summary 
judgment and the supporting and supplemental memoranda of the parties, finding that the essential 
facts necessary to decide the issues are not in dispute, and for good cause appearing: 
THE COURT FINDS AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT: 
1. The Agreement to provide pathology services was an enforceable contract 
under Utah law. 
2. The Agreement was terminable for "just cause" and the issue of whether or 
not "just cause" existed for UBMC to terminate the Agreement would be a question for a jury. 
However, the "just cause" issue has been made moot by this Court's other findings below. 
3. The Court agrees with the arguments espoused by UBMC in its memoranda 
and finds that Agreement was voidable with or without "just cause" because, under the undisputed 
#83873 vl 
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facts of this case, the Board of UBMC that entered into the Agreement with Dr. Hardy cannot bind 
future and/or successor Boards of UBMC to the contract with Dr. Hardy. As a governmental entity 
serving the needs of the public, the future and/or successor Boards of UBMC should not be bound 
by the Agreement because the Board of UBMC needs to be able to respond to the changing needs 
of its patients and the citizens it serves and to adjust to rapid advances in science and medical 
technology. 
4. The Court rejects Dr. Hardy's legal arguments regarding the "staggered 
term" concept. 
5. In the year the notice of termination was given by the existing Board of 
UBMC, there had been three new appointments to the Board of UBMC, and, therefore, a new 
Board of UBMC was in place. This new Board of UBMC lawfully terminated the voidable 
Agreement with Dr. Hardy. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
1. UBMC's Renewed Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons 
set forth in its memoranda. The Court's ruling on UBMC's Renewed Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment disposes of the issues raised in UBMC's declaratory 
judgment cause of action and the Court hereby rules that UBMC properly and 
lawfully terminated the Agreement with Dr. Hardy. 
2. Dr. Hardy's Renewed Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Dr. 
Hardy's counterclaims asserted against UBMC in this matter are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
#83873 v l 
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DATED this ^ day of May, 2000. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
John ^Harrington 
Joni J. Jones 
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaimant 
and Third-Party Defendant 
#83873 vl 
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I hereby certify that on the 5 day of May, 2000,1 caused to be mailed by United 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to the following: 
John P. Harrington, Esq. 
Joni J. Jones, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Clark A. McClellan 
McKeachnie, Alfred, McClellan & Trotter, P.C. 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 




November 29, 1994 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
P.O. Box 795 
Price, UT 84501 
Dear Dr. Hardy: 
We appreciate your response to our request to have a formal agreement in handling our 
Pathology needs. Listed below is the proposal submitted by you. I have reviewed this with 
Joe Hokett and have found that it meets the needs of Uintah Basin MedicaJ Center at this 
time. Our agreement, therefore, includes the following: 
1. Dr, Hardy agrees to personally visit the Uintah Basin Medical Center Laboratory 
weekly or will have another pathologist visit the hospital if he is unavailable. 
2. Visits will not be substituted with technologists. Duration of visit will be for one to 
two hours devoted to the following activities: 
a. CAP proficiency survey reviews. 
b. Review of Uintah Basin Medical Center QC program. 
c. Recommending process to investigate technical and administrative problems 
and advise adoption of policies and/or procedures for correction. 
d. Develop liaison with all full-time Medical Staff members to enable full 
understanding of laboratory's role in supporting Medical Staffs mission. Will 
attend Medical Staff meetings quarterly. This meeting will be considered chat 
week's laboratory visit. 
3. Will be available to the Medical Staff for help with interpretation of laboratory 
results. This would be a physician-to-physician consult. 
4. Will be available for more complex consultations, bone marrow biopsies, or fine 
needle aspiration biopsy of superficial masses (i.e,, breast, thyroid, lymph node). 
Procedures in these categories will be direct patient services and will be billed as 
such. 
5. Will undertake teaching activities for both Medical Staff and Laboratory Staff when 
new procedures are to be introduced. 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
November 29, 1994 
Page 2 of 2 
6. Every opportunity to educate Laboratory Staff in those areas where new 
information or the need for better understanding of the need for clinical consultation 
will be pursued. 
7. Will take responsibility for continued CLIA accreditation, including interim self-
inspection, review of manuals, and all activities CLIA has identified as Laboratory 
Director responsibilities. 
8. Uintah Basin Medical Center is permitted to formally register me with the State of 
Utah and CAP as Laboratory Director, and inclusion of my name on any and all 
laboratory reports, thus documenting my medicolegal relationship with the Uintah 
Basin Medical Center Laboratory. 
9. Uintah Basin Medical Center will pay a Laboratory Director's fee of $400.00 per 
month, 
10. All surgical pathology and extra-genital cytology is referred to the Laboratory 
Director's practice, additional activities such as Medical Staff committee work will be 
undertaken. These may include Infection Control, Tissue Reviews, Surgical Case 
Review, Blood Utilization Review, and involvement in hospical-wide Continuing 
Quality Improvement. 
11. This agreement shall become effective August U 1994 and continue to bind the parties 
to the terms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written notice for just cause 
of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice 
period. 
Your signature below indicates your acceptance of the responsibilities, services and benefits 
listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Bradley D.XeBaron, CHE 
Administrator 




UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER 
ARTICLE I 
Name and Purpose 
rnie. The Uintah Basin Medical Center is the official name of this hospital located at 250 
est 300 North, Roosevelt, Utah 84066. 
filiation. The hospital is owned by Duchesne County. The Hospital Board of Trustees is 
eated by the Duchesne County Commission. The Hospital is subject to the control and 
tpervision of the Board of Trustees of the Uintah Basin Medical Center. 
biectives. The Hospital shall be a licensed hospital. The Hospital provides a setting for 
atients to receive services for diagnosis, treatment, and/or other care by or under the direction 
f the physicians, through inpatient, outpatient, emergency and outreach services in Duchesne 
lounty. Its role, scope and mission are defined by the Board of Trustees. 
'tandard of care. These Bylaws along with the Medical Staff Bylaws and the Hospital Policies 
re prepared pursuant to Utah law for the proper conduct of the hospital purposes, activities 
jid conduct which affect or may affect patient care in the hospital. These references refer to 
jptimal or ideal standards of care to which hospital and medical personnel are encouraged to 
ichieve. Pursuant to Utah law, the standard of care of this hospital shall be a community 
itandard, i.e. that level of care required of health care providers in the same or similar 
immunity. 
ARTICLE II 
Board of Trustees 
Board of Trustees. The Uintah Basin Medical Center Board of Trustees, created by the 
Duchesne County Commission shall constitute the Board of Trustees and shall be known as the 
Board of Trustees of the Uintah Basin Medical Center. 
The Board of Trustees shall consist of nine (9) voting members, seven of which are appointed 
elected for three (3) year. Board members are eligible to fill a maximum of two consecutive 
three (3) year terms. 
County Commission Representative (Ex Officio). There shall at all times be a member of the 
)uchesne County Commission on the Board of Trustees. That Board member will be selected 
iy the Duchesne County Commission and shall serve as an ex officio member of the Board. 
This representative is a voting member of the Board. 
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sdical Staff-Renresomnnve. fFx Officio). The Board of Trustees shall have as a member the 
lief of Medical Staff of Duchesne County Hospital who shall be nominated by the Medical 
aff and shall serve as an ex officio member of the Board. This representative is a voting 
ember of the Board of Trustees. 
ospital Administrator (Ex Officio w/o vote). The Administrator of the Hospital shall serve as 
non-voting member of the Board. 
emoval Any Board of Trustees member may be removed from office upon a vote of two 
lirds (2/3) of the incumbent Board of Trustee members and upon the final action of the County 
lommissioners. 
ippointment and Vacancies. All appointments to fill vacancies on the Board of Trustees shall 
-e made by the County Commission, whether such vacancies occur by death, resignation, 
emoval, expiration of term, increase or decrease in the number of Board members. The 
Commission will be provided recommended nominees by the Hospital Board of Trustees. The 
Appointment or reappointment of the chairmanships of the standing committees of the Board 
;hall be done annually as recommended by the Chairman in conjunction and concurrent with 
he election of the Board of Trustees. 
General Powers. The Board of Trustees shall exercise the responsibility for the operation of 
the hospital and related health care facilities and shall have the following duties, responsibilities 
tnd powers: 
Establishing policies and programs for the hospital including adopting, reviewing and revising 
Hospital Bylaws. 
Establishing appropriate controls to insure that policies of the Hospital are implemented. 
Provide for the approval of an annual operating plan and generally oversee the hospital's 
operation to insure that it is kept within the framework of the annual plan. 
Review and approve the administrator's capital equipment plan. 
Provide for the development of a strategic plan that describes the role, programs, capital 
equipment and facility requirements of the hospital for the next three years. 
Appointment and reappointment of the hospital's medical staff and allied health professionals 
and taking final action with respect to clinical privileges and corrective action as set forth in 
iiese and the Medical Staff Bylaws; approval of the Medical Staff Bylaws adopted by the 
Medical Staff. 
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)Pting and implementing a development program for broadening the local financial base for 
port of the hospital. 
:eive regular reports from the hospital's medical staff regarding the quality of care being 
dered in the hospital. 
proval of the personnel policies and annual wage and salary administration program. 
;ablishing an appeal mechanism and acting as final appeal body for grievances and issues 
ated to medical staff privileges. 
ARTICLE m 
Meetings of Board of Trustees 
pillar Meetings. Regular meetings of the Board of Trustees shall be held on the third (3rd) 
mrsday of each month (unless otherwise changed) at the Uintah Basin Medical Center 
fecial Meetings. Special meetings of the Board of Trustees may be held at the call of the 
lairman or in his absence the Vice Chairman or in their absence, the majority of the Board 
embers upon three (3) business days notice to all Board members. 
otice of Resular or Special Meetings: Waiver. The Assistant Executive Secretary or other 
ssignee of the Board shall notify each Board member of every regular or special meeting by 
lailing a notice thereof at least five (5) days prior to the meeting (except for special meetings) 
) his or her last known post office address, postage prepaid. Attendance of a Board member 
t any meeting shall constitute a waiver of notice of such meeting, except when such member 
ttends a meeting for the express purpose of objecting to the transaction of any business 
ecause the meeting is not lawfully called or convened. 
Quorum and Manner of Acting. A majority of the Board members shall constitute a quorum 
"or the transaction of business at any meeting of the Board of Trustees. The act of a majority 
)f those present at a meeting at which such quorum is present shall be the act of the Board. 
!f a quorum is not present at any meeting those present can declare a quorum and acts will be 
,n force unless actions are rescinded at the next meeting of the Board where a quorum is 
present. 
Attendance Requirement. Board members will be expected to attend at least sixty (60) percent 
of the Board meetings held during each calendar year and take an active role in committee 
assignments. 
designation. Any Board member may resign at any time by submitting his or her resignation, 
.n writing, to the Board of Trustees or the chairman or vice-chairman thereof. The County 
:ommission shall be notified of any resignations. A resignation shall become effective upon 
ts acceptance by the Board of Trustees. If the Board has not acted thereon within thirty (30) 
lays from the date presented, such resignation shall be deemed accepted. 
ARTICLE IV 
Officers 
Chairman of the Board. The Board of Trustees shall be presided over by a Chairman, who 
shall be elected annually, usually in January, by the Board. The Chairman will serve for a 
:erm of one (1) year. The Chairman shall preside at all meetings of the Board and shall be a 
voting ex-offlcio member of all committees thereof. 
Vice Chairman of the Board. The Board of Trustees shall elect a Vice-chairman from among 
its members usually in January. The Vice-Chairman will serve for a term of one (1) year. The 
Vice-chairman shall act as Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman and shall 
perform such other duties as may be assigned by the Chairman. 
The Secretary/Treasurer. The Board of Trustees shall elect a Secretary/Treasurer of the 
Hospital Board, usually in January. The Secretary/Treasurer shall be responsible to see that 
a record of all proceedings of the Hospital Board is kept and that all necessary correspondence 
"s accomplished. The Secretary/Treasurer shall preside at meetings of the Board of Trustees 
<h the absence of the Chairman and Vice Chairman. 
/lospital Administrator. The Hospital Administrator shall be appointed by the Duchesne County 
Hospital Board of Trustees. The Administrator shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the 
hospital. The Administrator shall be responsible for the management and operation of the 
hospital and shall provide liaison to the Board of Trustees, Medical Staff and the departments 
of the hospital. The administrator shall submit an annual report based on achievements of the 
Hospital and its goals and obligations to the Board of Trustees of the Hospital. 
Assistant Treasurer. The Assistant Treasurer, usually the Chief Financial Officer of the 
Hospital, shall be appointed by the Administrator. This person, under direction of the 
Administrator, will prepare appropriate reports for the Hospital Board. 
Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary shall be appointed by the Administrator. The 
Assistant Secretary shall, under the direction of the Secretary Treasurer, act as custodian of ail 
records and reports of the Hospital Board. The secretary shall also be responsible to see that 




immittees of the Board. The Board of Trustees may, by resolution, designate three or 
>re committees each consisting of two or more Trustees, shall have and exercise such 
thority as shall be delegated by the Hospital Board. All committee members shall serve at 
; pleasure of the Hospital Board and may be removed or replaced from committee 
signments with or without cause at any time by the majority of the Hospital Board. 
tecutive Committee. The Executive Committee shall consist of the officers of the Board as 
rfined. Shall serve as the strategic planning committee of the Hospital Board and as the 
ospital Bylaws Committee. The Chairman of the Board will act as the Chairman. 
his Executive Committee will serve as the investigating arm of the Hospital Board at the 
jquest of the Chairman. 
"his committee shall have power to transact all regular business of the hospital during the 
itervals between meetings of the Hospital Board, provided chat any action taken shall not 
onflict with the policies and expressed wishes of the Hospital Board and that all matters of 
najor importance shall be referred to the Hospital Board for ratification. 
'inance Committee. Specific functions of the Finance Committee shall consist of the following: 
The Finance Committee shall cause to be prepared and submit to the Hospital Board at its last 
meeting before the end of the year, an operating plan showing expected income and expense 
for the ensuing year. 
The Finance Committee shall examine the monthly financial reports and seek explanations for 
any inordinate variations from the budget. 
The Committee shall recommend to the Board auditors to perform an annual audit of the use 
of operational funds of the hospital. 
The committee shall make recommendations in matters pertaining to the deposit of trust funds, 
endowments and the use of the incomes derived from those deposits. 
The committee shall be charged to review all insurance policies of the hospital and make 
recommendations regarding the negotiations and purchase of such coverage as is necessary to 
protect the assets of the Hospital. 
fhe Secretary/Treasurer of the Board will act as the Chairman of this committee. 
oint Conference Committee. Shall consist of Chairman of the Hospital Board plus one regular 
lember of the Board, Chief of Staff and one member of me active medical staff, the 
.dministrator and one other member of his Administrative Staff. The Chairman of the Hospital 
oard shall be the Chairman of the committee. 
his committee shall act as medical and administrative liaison between the Hospital Board, the 
ledical staff of the hospital and the Hospital's Administration. The committee shall try to 
romote mutual understanding and cooperation between the Hospital Board, the medical staff 
ad administration. It shall be a vehicle to enable the Hospital Board to consider matters 
roposed by the medical staff and shall be an instrument to interpret official hospital policy to 
ie medical staff. The functions of the committee shall be advisory only. Such body shall act 
s a deliberative, but not decision making, body to make recommendation thereon to the Board 
f Trustees, Medical Staff and or Administration. 
"he committee shall meet at the call of the Chairman, the Chief of the Medical Staff, or the 
lospital Administrator, prior to the monthly meeting of the Hospital Board. 
ARTICLE VI 
The Administrator 
leneral Statement, The Board of Trustees shall select a competent Administrator who shall 
•erve as the chief executive officer. The Administrator shall be the Board's direct 
•epresentative in the management of the Hospital. The Administrator shall be given the 
lecessary authority and be held responsible for the administration of the hospital, all of its 
lepartments and all of its activities; subject only to such policies that may be adopted and such 
>rders as may be issued by the Hospital Board or any of its committees acting within it powers. 
Administrator shall be the authorized representative of the Hospital Board in all matters except 
.hose the Hospital Board has formally assigned to some other person for specific purposes. 
ARTICLE VII 
The Medical Staff 
Organization, The Board of Trustees shall appoint a Medical Staff and a Dental Staff (herein 
after referred to as Medical Staff) composed of qualified physicians and dentists who are duly 
licensed to practice medicine or dentistry in the State of Utah and except as provided by the 
Medical Staff Bylaws, can appoint other allied health professionals. Membership in this 
organization shall be prerequisite to the exercise of clinical privileges in the Hospital except as 
otherwise specifically provided in the Medical Staff Bylaws. The Medical Staff shall be 
organized into a responsible administrative unit with elected officers. It shall adopt bylaws, 
rules and regulations to govern its operation. It shall comply with the standards of the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The Board of Trustees shall approve the Medical 
otaff Bylaws. 
c 
The Medical Staff Bylaws, rules and regulations upon the concunence and the approval of the 
hospital Board shall become part of the official Bylaws of the Duchesne County Hospital. 
Purpose. The Medical Staff organization shall propose and adopt Bylaws, rules and 
Regulations for its internal governance which shall be effective when approved by the Board. 
IThese Bylaws shall create an effective administrative unit to discharge the functions and 
•esponsibilities assigned to the Medical Staff by the Board. The Bylaws, rules and regulations 
ihall state the purposes, functions and organization of the staff and shall set forth the policies 
>y which the Medical Staff exercises and accounts for its delegated authority and 
•esponsibilities. 
Procedure. The Medical Staff shall have the initial responsibility to formulate, adopt and 
:ecommend to the Board staff Bylaws and amendments thereto which shall be effective when 
ipproved by the Board. 
\fedical Staff Membership & Clinical Privileges* All applications for appointments to the 
Medical Staff shall be in writing and shall be addressed to the Administrator. 
Ml appointments to the Medical Staff shall be for two (2) years only, and upon annual 
application and the approval of the Medical Credentials Committee and other Committees as 
\ppointed, shall be renewable by the Hospital Board. 
The Board shall and does hereby delegate to the Medical Staff the responsibility and authority 
£> investigate and evaluate all matters relating the Medical Staff membership status (including 
appointment and reappointment), clinical privileges, and corrective action, and shall require the 
Staff to make recommendations thereon. In taking final action, the Board shall consider staff 
recommendations submitted provided that the Board shall act in any event if the staff fails to 
adopt and submit any such recommendation within the time period required by the Medical 
Staff Bylaws. 
Medical Staff Recommendations. The Medical Staff Bylaws shall contain provisions for the 
staff to adopt and submit to the Board specific written recommendations on all matters of 
Medical Staff membership status, (including appointment and reappointment) clinical privileges 
and corrective action, and to support and document its recommendations in a manner that will 
allow die Board to take informed action. 
Criteria for Board Action. In acting on matters of Medical Staff membership the Board 
shall consider the Staffs recommendations, the Hospital's needs, and such other standards as 
are set forth in the Medical Staff Bylaws, In granting and defining the scope of clinical 
privileges to be exercised by each practitioner, the Board shall consider the staffs 
/ecommendations, the supporting information on which they are based and such criteria as are 
iet forth in the Medical Staff Bylaws- No aspect of membership status or specific clinical 
privileges shall be limited or denied to a practitioner solely on the basis of sex, religion, race, 
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mdicap, creed, color, or national origin, or on the basis of anj other criteria unrelated to 
Dod patient care at the Hospital, or to professional ability and judgment, or to Hospital or 
Drnmurity needs. 
erms and Conditions of Staff Membership and Clinical Privileges. 
he terms and conditions of membership status in the Medical Staff, and of the exercise of 
inical privileges, shall be as specified in the Medical Staff Bylaws. 
very doctor must have proof of one million dollars malpractice insurance with an aggregate 
f three million dollars in their file before given staff privileges at the Hospital, Evidence of 
isurance (i.e. copy of policy or certificate of insurance, etc.) will be submitted at the time 
taff privileges are reviewed and in March of every other year. 
rocedure. The procedure to be followed by the Medical Staff and the Board in acting on 
tatters of membership status, clinical privileges and corrective action shall be specified in the 
ledical Staff Bylaws. 
Membership Status. Privileges. Review, Each physician member of the Medical Staff shall 
e subject to an ongoing review of his professional care. At least every two (2) years each 
lember shall have an in-depth peer review to determine his competency for purposes of re-
ssignment of privileges. 
"he Medical Staff Credentials Committee shall make recommendations to the Board of Trustees 
oncerning all staff appointments, reappointments, suspensions, reprimands, periods of 
robation, and other changes in staff status or clinical privileges, disciplinary action, all matters 
slated to professional competency, and such other specific matters as may be referred to by 
le Board of Trustees. 
.1 action on matters of Medical Staff Membership status, the Board shall consider the staffs 
^commendations, the Hospital's and the community's needs, and such additional criteria as are 
et forth in the Medical Staff Bylaws. In granting and defining the scope of the clinical 
rivileges to be exercised by each practitioner, the Board shall consider the staffs 
ecommendations, the supporting information on which they are based, and such criteria as are 
et forth in the Medical Staff Bylaws. 
Zhanee in Status and Privileges. The Board of Trustees may, for just cause, decline to make 
eappointments to the Medical Staff or may reduce or alter staff privileges or suspend or 
lismiss any Medical Staff member from the Staff and from practice in the Hospital. Such 
.ction may, but need not, be taken upon the recommendation of the Medical Staff Committee. 
Vhen the Board of Trustees determines not to renew an appointment to the Medical Staff, or 
vhen staff privileges have been or are proposed to be reduced, altered, suspended or 
8 
rminated, the staff member in question shall be afforded the opportunity of a hearing before 
1 appropriate committee of the Medical Staff 
id to appellate review by the Board of Trustees in accordance with the provisions of the 
[edical Staff Bylaws. 
ejection of Recommendations. When the Board of Trustees of the Hospital rejects a 
commendation by the Medical Staff, the Board shall specify a reasonable time during which 
will delay its action to allow a meeting of a special Joint Committee of the Board of Trustees 
id the Medical Staff to consider the matter. Members of said Committee shall be appointed 
. equal numbers by the Board of Trustees and the Medical Staff. The report of said 
ommittee, or failure to issue a report, shall not bind the Board of Trustees. 
Imitation of Membership. The Board of Trustees may decide to limit, deny, suspend, or 
rminate Medical Staff membership for any purpose reasonably related to the delivery of 
jality patient care services, including but not limited to: 
(a) The Hospital's ability to provide services related to a medical specialty or sub-
specialty; 
(b) The Hospital's patient load; 
(c) The determination that granting Medical Staff membership is inconsistent with the 
mission, role and purpose of the Hospital; 
(d) The Failure of the practitioner to comply with the terms of the Hospital or Medical 
Staff Bylaws, rules and regulations; 
(e) Any other reason specified in these or the Medical Staff Bylaws or others not 
specified which are reasonably related to the delivery of quality patient care. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Volunteer Auxiliary 
ippointment. The Board of Trustees may appoint a Volunteer Auxiliary comprised of 
:ommunity-minded individuals who are interested in serving the patients and furthering the 
>urposes of the Hospital. 
^urpose. The Volunteer Auxiliary shall promote good public relations between the Hospital 
ind its surrounding community, to render such volunteer services to the Hospital and its 
iatients as may be approved by the Administrator, and to raise funds for the Hospital through 
Q 
such activities, and methods as may be approved by the Administrator. 
-Organization. The Volunteer Auxiliary shall be organized into a responsible administrative 
init with elected officers. Such auxiliary shall adopt Bylaws and rules and regulations for the 
government of its conduct and its services within the Hospital, subject to the approval of the 
Board of Trustees. Such Bylaws shall be in accordance with the guidelines established by the 
American Hospital Association for Hospital Auxiliaries. 
Hospital Administrator will coordinate all activities of the volunteer auxiliary. 
ARTICLE IX 
Patient Eligibility 
Ml Persons shall be served by the Hospital if it is within the capabilities of the Hospital, 
•egardless of race, religion, creed, national origin, sex, handicap or ability to pay. 
ARTICLE X 
Review and Amendment of Hospital Bylaws 
Hospital Bylaws shall be reviewed every two (2) years. The omission or failure of the Board 
>f Trustees to review its Bylaws shall not affect the validity of said Bylaws. 
The Bylaws may be amended in whole or in part by affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the 
nembers of the Board of Trustees at any annual, regular or special meeting, provided that a 
ull statement of the proposed amendment shall be made available to the members of Board of 
'rustees prior to any such vote, and provided further that these Bylaws shall be in conformity 
rith those of Uintah Basin Medical Center. 
APPROVED BY-fHEyiNTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER BOARD: 
:HAIRMAN 
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 








RULING ON MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 9947-167 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Petitioner Charles S. Garlett ("Charles") has moved for a 
new trial, asserting the discovery of evidence that he is not the 
father of one of the children. That motion is supported by no 
affidavit. Respondent Jennifer T. Garlett ("Jennifer") has 
submitted a verified response asserting that Charles was well 
aware of the possibility - or even probability - that he was not 
the father of one of the children. Charles has submitted no 
reply, nor any affidavit supporting his assertion that the 
evidence is newly discovered. 
The motion for new trial is denied. Because the motion 
has so little merit, the court exercises its discretion in 
domestic relations cases to award Jennifer her fees in responding 
to the motion. Counsel for Jennifer should submit an affidavit 
with her proposed order pursuant to Rule 4-5.04. 
Dated this ._
 w day of October, -2Q00. 
- x £ / 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 994700167 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail MARY C. CORPORON 
ATTORNEY 
8 08 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
Suite 1400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102 
By Hand HAPPY MORGAN 
Dated this £l^\iay of f) C-Voicv v~ , 20£xf> . 
Deputy Court ClerJ 
Page 1 (last) 
Exhibit "B 
HAPPY MORGAN, #7586 
Attorney at Law 
8 South 100 East 
Moab, UT 84532 
(435)259-9418 
Fax: (435) 259-3979 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES S. GARLETT, : 
Petitioner, 
vs. : 
JENNIFER T. GARLETT, 
Respondent 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
: Civil No. 9947-167 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
The Court, having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based upon 
the Memorandum Decision in the above matter of July 10, 2000 and on testimony of the 
parties hereto and argument of Counsel, hereby 
ADJUDGES, DECREES AND ORDERS as follows: 
1. The bonds of matrimony and marriage contract between the parties are 
dissolved, and they are awarded a Decree of Divorce from each other, to become final 
upon entry by the Court. 
2. Jennifer T. Garlett is awarded the permanent sole care, custody, and 
control of the parties' minor children: Travis Charles Garlett, born January 28,1987; 
Corie Elizabeth Garlett, bom August 15,1990; and Taylor Hallie Garlett, bom May 11, 
1994. 
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3. Charles S. Garlett is awarded reasonable and liberal visitation in accor-
dance with Utah Code Annotated §30-3-35 (Minimum schedule for visitation for 
children 5 to 18 years of age) as follows: 
a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the 
court from 5:30 p,m. until 8:30 p.m.; 
b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the 
Decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, continuing each year; 
c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall 
not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial 
parent shall be responsible for the childrens' attendance at school for that school day; 
e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total 
holiday period extends beyond that time so that the children are free from school and the 
parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday 
period; 
f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to 
the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial, he may take 
other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 
7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) Spring Break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day 
school lets out for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 
2 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., 
so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to 
the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 
9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings 
along for the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on 
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled; 
(v) the Fall School Break, if applicable, commonly known as 
U. E. A. Weekend, beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 
7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday 
at 7 p.m.; 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so 
long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
h) Father's Day shall be spent with the father every year beginnings9 a.m. 
3 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the mother every year beginning at 9 
a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the 
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninter-
rupted time during the childrens' summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended visitation shall be one-half of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, 
provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the children 
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
4. Charles S. Garlett's child support obligation is set at $1,050.00 per 
month, pursuant to the "Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act", Utah Code Annotated 
§78-45-1 et seq. Pursuant to §30-3-10.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
the payment of child support shall be one-half on or before the 5th of the month in which 
it is due and one-half on or before the 20th of the month in which it is due. 
5. Jennifer T. Garlett is entitled to claim the parties' minor children as 
dependents for tax purposes, but Charles S. Garlett may purchase them from her annually 
by paying her what they save her in taxes. 
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6. Jennifer T. Garlett is entitled to alimony and Charles S. Garlett is ordered 
to pay to her the sum of $600.00 per month for a period of sixteen years, which was the 
duration of the marriage of the parties. Pursuant to §30-3-10.5, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) the payment of alimony shall be made one-half on or before the 
5th of the month in which it is due and one-half on or before the 20th of the month in 
which it is due. 
7. Jennifer T. Garlett is awarded the sole use of the marital home for she and 
the children until the youngest child, Taylor Hallie Garlett, born May 11,1994, reaches 
the age of eighteen years of age or she and the children move from the home. The ability 
of Jennifer T. Garlett to live, with the children, rent free, is part of her alimony settlement. 
8. When the youngest child, Taylor Hallie Garlett, reaches the age of 
eighteen years of age or Jennifer T. Garlett and the children move from the home, 
whichever occurs first, the home will be sold and the proceeds will be split equally 
between Charles S. Garlett and Jennifer T. Garlett. 
9. The other marital assets of the parties shall be divided as follows: 
To the Petitioner, Charles S. Garlett: The business equipment because he needs 
these assets to earn a living, including a 1999 pickup truck. He also pay all business 
debts including all debts listed in Respondent's Exhibit 7; also to Petitioner, the boat and 
trailer and the camp trailer, his sporting goods and personal property, except where the 
parties have made other arrangements. 
To the Respondent, Jennifer T. Garlett: The home furnishings and the jewelry; 
the computer; the Suburban, the payment for which she is responsible. 
5 
10. The vacant lot, identified at Trial, shall be sold and the first $10,500 of the 
sale proceeds after payment of the debt and any sale costs, shall be paid to Jennifer T. 
Garlett to offset Charles S. Garlett being awarded the boat and trailer and the camp trailer. 
The balance of this sale, if any, shall be divided between Charles S. Garlett and Jennifer 
T.Garlett, equally. 
11. Jennifer T. Garlett is awarded a judgment for back child support and 
alimony in the amount of $3,050 covering the arrearages through June 1, 2000. 
12. The Petitioner's income is subject to immediate and automatic income 
withholding if a delinquency in payment of child support and alimony exists for thirty 
(30) days. Each month's child support and alimony payment shall be paid one-half on or 
before the 5th of the month in which it is due and one-half on or before the 20th of the 
month in which it is due and if not paid timely is delinquent thereafter. 
13. Charles S. Garlett is required to maintain health, dental, optical and 
medical emergency insurance on the minor children of the parties until each one reaches 
the age of eighteen. Charles S. Garlett and Jennifer T. Garlett shall each be responsible 
for one-half of the premium on said insurance policy. Charles S. Garlett and Jennifer T. 
Garlett shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental, optical 
or medical treatment which is not covered by the insurance policy on the minor children 
including deductibles and copayments. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall 
provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other 
parent within 30 days of payment. The parent incurring medical expenses may be 
denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent*s*share 
6 
of the expenses if that parent fails to provide verification within 30 days of payment. 
4. Both parties are ordered to share equally the reasonable work-related 
or career or occupational training costs for child care expenses of the custodial parent. 
a. The non-custodial parent shall begin paying his share of child 
care expenses on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of 
proof of the child care expenses. 
b. The custodial parent shall provide written verification of the cost 
and identity of a child care provider to the non-custodial parent upon 
initial engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other 
parent. The custodial parent shall notify the other parent of any change of 
a child care provider or the monthly expense of child care within 30 
calendar days of the date of the change. The custodial parent may be 
denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the one-
half of the expense if the parent incurring the expenses fails to comply 
with these provisions. 
15. Each party shall pay his or her own legal fees in the divorce up to the 
Trial. 
16. Each party shall execute any documents which are necessary to 
implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
DATED this day of , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on November 10, 2000 I mailed/hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing documents to the following: Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, 
Exhibit A and the Decree Of Divorce. 
Mary Corporon 
808 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
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BY 
TBI SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
8TATE Of UTAH 
CHARLES S» OARLBTT 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JENNIFER T. OARLBTT 
D«f«n4*nt.# 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Ca»« NO. 9947-167 
Ju4?« Lyl« R. An<S«r«on 
Charles S* Garlett ("Chuck") and Jennifer T. Garlett 
("Jennifer11) have been married since 1983. They have three 
children, born in 1987, 1990, and 1994t Both chuck and Jennifer 
adroit to infidelity during the marriage. Jennifer claims that 
her infidelity was an isolated incident responding to her 
discovery of Chuck's affair with another woman* Both apparently 
decided to stay together after this mutual infidelity became 
known. More recently, Chuck has become sexually involved with a 
woman who was described during the trial only as Dr, Etsel'e 
former fiancee. Despite Chuck's recent infidelity, Jennifer does 
not seek a divorce• Chuck does, citing irreconcilable 
differences which include Jennifer's alleged failure to take care 
of the finances, high living, and failure to take care of the 
marital home. Regardless of the legitimacy of these complaints, 
the complaints unquestionably exist and appear to be 
1 
n 
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irreconcilable. Chuck is therefore entitled to the divorce he 
seeks. 
Both Chuck and Jennifer seek custody of the children. Both 
have a good relationship with the children and are involved in 
the lives of the children. Jennifer has had custody since the 
separation and was the primary caretaker of the children during 
the marriage. She was essentially a stay at home mother to the 
children during most of their lives. Chuck has involved his 
paramour in his life with the children, which is not usually a 
good idea. ordinarily, girlfriends should not be introduced to 
the children until it is evident that a legal commitment is both 
likely and legally possible. The paramour does treat the children 
well. 
It is clear that Jennifer should have primary responsibility 
for the children. On all of the factors where there is a 
difference between Chuck and Jennifer, the circumstances favor 
Jennifer. These include her status as primary and present 
caretaker, her at least marginally superior moral character and 
her ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care. 
Jennifer also intensely desires that Chuck be Involved in the 
lives of the children. Chuck does not manifest such a desire. 
The parties did not present significant evidence on the 
question of joint custody. The court is not persuaded that the 
parents are capable of implementing joint legal custody or that 
2 
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the best interest of the children would be served by joint legal 
custody- Chuck has proposed having the children divide their 
time equally between the parents. This court believes such an 
arrangement would leave the children without a place they can 
call home* Jennifer is awarded sole legal custody. 
The court will not define visitation at this time, Jennifer 
clearly desires that the children have extensive interaction with 
Chuck. The court will order that Chuck have reasonable and 
liberal visitation. If the parties are ultimately unable to 
agree on the specifics, they may return to this court, which is 
likely to impose the standard visitation schedule. 
Chuck maintains that his income has averaged about $30,000 
per year. His federal income tax return* reflect incomes in that 
range for 1994-98* He admits "fudging" his income by $5,000 
during at least two of those years, Jennifer claims that the 
family spent $50,000 to $80,000 per yearf The court has heard 
testimony about the possessions accumulated by Chuck and 
Jennifer, as well as their lifestyle, and finds Jennifers 
position better supported by that evidence. Chuck maintains that 
the has had difficulty maintaining his business during the past 
year because of the stress of the divorce. He admits to turning 
down at least one opportunity to do significant work because he 
did not think he could do it justice in his present state. 
Nevertheless, he has received $28,000 for his services so far in 
3 
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2000, $11,000 in direct compensation from Pete Byrd, and $17,000 
in loans from Roma and Ray Knuth, for whom he is building a home. 
The court is persuaded that any reduction in Chuck's income is 
the product of this oonsoious choice. It is not unusual to see 
claims that business has gone down when alimony or child support 
are about to be calculated. Chuck is capable of, earning, and 
has actually earned, at least $50,000 per year. His child 
support obligation will be based on the assumption that he earns 
$50,000 per year. Jennifer has sought employment, but has 
limited skills and has not qualified for jobs paying more than 
minimum wage. Her employment has been seasonal as well. Taking 
the seasonality of her employment into account, as well as her 
need to be home to care for the children when they are not in 
school, the court will base Jennifer's child support calculation 
on the expectation that she will earn minimum wage for 30 hours 
per week. Jennifer will be entitled to the tax exemption and 
credits for the children, but Chuck may purchase them from her 
annually by paying her what they save her in taxes, 
Jennifer is entitled to alimony. She will receive about 
$1050 in child support, she will earn about $600 per month in 
take home pay. She has demonstrated a need for $2,134*50 per 
month to cover expenses for herself and the children. Alimony 
will be taxable to her. The court will award $600 per month 
alimony with the expectation that she will net $500 to cover her 
4 
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expenses. Chuck is able to pay this amount. If Jennifer and the 
children can live on $2134.50 per month, Chuck can live on what 
remains of his monthly income after he pays $1650 in child 
support and alimony. 
Jennifer's budget includes no provision for rent or a 
mortgage payment. She lives in the marital home, which is debt 
free. Chuck asks that the marital home be cold so that he and 
Jennifer will each have *ome money to etart over with. His plan 
is apparently to use his half of the sale proceeds to buy the 
materials for a new home which is larger than the marital home. 
In fact, he has already started building that home.1 Jennifer's 
only option, since she does not have Chuck's expertise or 
equipment, would be to purchase a much more modest home in a 
different neighborhood, or obtain a substantial mortgage. The 
children know the marital home as their home and it is a source 
of stability for them. If the court were to order the home sold, 
it would probably have to substantially increase the alimony. 
The court accordingly orders that Jennifer be permitted to 
continue living in the home until the youngest child is eighteen 
years old, or until Jennifer and the children move out of the 
1
 Chuck testified that he Is building a home with money from Ray and Roma Knuth. 
They are also advancing him some money for living expenses. If he is able, he will pay them 
back this loan and reimburse them for the material costs. He hopes to take about $100,000 
from the sale of the marital home, pay these obligations, and end up with a new home worth 
about $200,000.00 
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house> The house will then be sold, and Chuck and Jennifer will 
l each receive one-half of the proceeds. 
Chuck and Jennifer own other marital assets. The court will 
award Chuck's business equipment to him because he needs these 
! assets to earn a living to support himself and pay his alimony 
and child support. He will be required to pay all business 
debts. The business assets include the 1999 pickup and the 
business debts include all debts listed in Exhibit 7. Chuck and 
Jennifer have each attempted to value the furnishings of the home 
and Chuck's guns, fishing tackle and similar sporting goods. As 
might be expectedf each declares that what the other wants is the 
J most valuable. The court believes there is very little value 
j difference between these items, and that they are personal items 
I whose value is very dependent on their meaning to each person and 
the use each could make. The most reasonable resolution of this 
dispute is to award Jennifer the home furnishings and the jewelry 
and Chuck the sporting goods, except where they have made other 
arrangements. Jennifer gets the computer and the Suburban. 
There are, however, some items of significant value that can 
be fairly evaluated. They are as follows: 
I £ * B y»i i f &fife£ Ks£ z&iu£ 
1995 Boat and Trailer $12,000 $8000 $4,000 
I Camp Trailer $6,000 0 $6,500 
Vacant Lot $60,000 $42,000 $18,000 
6 
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The boat and trailer, and the camp trailer are awarded to 
Chuck. The vacant lot should be sold and the first $10,500 of 
the sale proceeds after payment of the debt and any sale costs, 
should be paid to Jennifer. The balance, if any, should be 
divided between Chuck and Jennifer equally. 
Jennifer has asked the court to award judgment for unpaid 
support. She has established that Chuck failed to pay $4,800 in 
support for February to June, 2000. However, the court's 
ultimate child support and alimony award is only $1650 per month. 
It is therefore fair and appropriate that Chuck receive a credit 
of $350 per month, reducing the unpaid support obligation to 
$3,050.00, for which Jennifer will also be awarded judgment. Each 
party should pay its own legal fees. 
Counsel for Jennifer is directed to prepare formal findings, 
conclusions and a decree, which the court will sign when the 
parties have completed their mandatory divorce education. 
7 
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Interpretation combined Paternity Index 0 Eiafaabilitv of Paternity 0 % 
The alleged father. Charles Scott Garlett, is excluded as the biological father of the child named 
Taylor H. Garlett. The alleged father lacks the genetic markers that must be contributed to the 
chQd by the biological father. Based on testing results obtained from DNA probes: D2S44, 
D4S163, D7S467, and D10S28, the probability of paternity is 0%. 
^ u b s c r j j ^ j » ^ m | ) H M ^ m e on August 4, 2000 
Notary p 
My comniisSft^Nfrittfs October 5, 2003 
\. the undersigned, verify thai the interpretation of the 
results is correct as reported, and the testing procedure 
was conducted in accordance with ihe AABB guidelines. 
_zg#&4-£. 
Thomas M. Reid, Ph.D. 
Assistant Laboratory Director 
Exhibit "E 
HAPPY MORGAN, #7586 
Attorney at Law 
8 South 100 East 
Moab, UT 84532 
(435)259-9418 
Fax:(435)259-3979 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES S. GARLETT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JENNIFER T. GARLETT, 
Respondent 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: Civil No. 9947-167 
Judge Lyie R. Anderson 
The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision in the above matter on July 
10,2000, based on testimony of the parties hereto and argument of Counsel, hereby 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties hereto have been married since 1983. 
2. Jurisdiction properly rests in Grand County, State of Utah, 
3. There were three children bom as a result of this union: Travis Charles 
Garlett, bom January 28,1987; Corie Elizabeth Garlett, bom August 15,1990; and 
Taylor Hallie Garlett, bom May 11,1994. 
4. Both parties admit to infidelity during the marriage. 
5. Although despite the infidelity in the past and a current infidelity on the 
part of the Petitioner, the Respondent does not desire a divorce. The Petitioner does, 
however, desire a divorce, citing irreconcilable differences, 
6. Although both parties seek: custody of the children and both have good 
relationship with the children and are involved in the lives of their children, the Respon-
dent has had custody since the separation and was the primary caretaker of the children 
during the marriage. She was essentially a stay at home mother to the children during 
most of their lives. The Respondent intensely desires that the Petitioner be involved in 
the lives of the children but the Petitioner does not manifest such a desire. 
7. The Court is not persuaded that the parents are capable of implementing 
joint legal custody or that the best interest of the children would be served by joint legal 
custody. 
8. The Respondent clearly desires that the children have extensive inter-
action with the Petitioner. 
9. It is in the best interest of the children that Charles S. Garlett, the 
Petitioner, have reasonable and liberal visitation in accordance with Utah Code 
Annotated §30-3-35 (minimum schedule for visitation for children 5 to 18 years of 
age) as follows: 
a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or 
the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; 
b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry 
of the Decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, continuing each year, 
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c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall 
not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial 
parent shall be responsible for the childrens' attendance at school for that school 
day; 
e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total 
holiday period extends beyond that time so that the children are free from school 
and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this 
lengthier holiday period; 
f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to 
the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial, he 
may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 
7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) Spring Break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day 
school lets out for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school 
resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday. 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 
1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
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g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to 
the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on 
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) the Fall School Break, if applicable, commonly known as 
U.E.A. Weekend, beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 
7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday 
at 7 p.m.; 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined 
in subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 
9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
h) Father's Day shall be spent with the father every year beginning at 9 a.m. 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the mother every year beginning at 
9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
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(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the 
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of 
uninterrupted time during the childrens' summer vacation from school for 
purposes of vacation; 
1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended visitation shall be one-half of the vacation time for year-round school 
breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the children 
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable 
duration. 
10. The Petitioner has maintained that his income has averaged about 
$30,000.00 per year and his federal income tax returns reflect income in that range 
for 1994-1998, however the lifestyle and standard of living of the parties supports the 
position of the Respondent that the family spent $50,000.00 to $80,000.00 per year. 
11. The Petitioner maintains that he had had difficulty maintaining his 
business during the past year because of the stress of the divorce. However, he has 
turned down at least one opportunity to do significant work because he did not think he 
could do it justice in his present state. Nevertheless, he has received $28,000.00 for 
his services during the first seven months of the year 2000, $11,000.00 in direct 
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compensation from Pete Byrd, and $17,000.00 in loans from Roma and Ray Knuth, 
for whom he is building a home. The Court is persuaded that any reduction in the 
income of the Petitioner is the product of this conscious choice. The Court finds that 
the Petitioner is capable of earning, and has actually earned, at least $50,000 per 
year. His child support obligation will be based on the assumption that he earns 
$50,000 per year. 
12. The Respondent has sought employment, but has limited skills and 
has not qualified for jobs paying more than minimum wage. Her employment has been 
seasonal as well Taking the seasonality of her employment into account, as well as 
her need to be home to care for the children when they are not in school, the Court 
will base the Respondent's child support calculation on the expectation that she will 
earn minimum wage for 30 hours per week. 
13. The Respondent should be entitled to the tax exemption and credits 
for the children, but the Petitioner may purchase them from her annually by paying 
her what they save her in taxes. 
14« The Respondent is entitled to alimony for the next sixteen years, 
which is the same as the duration of the marriage. Alimony will be taxable to her. 
15. The Respondent has demonstrated a need for $2,134.50 per month to 
cover expenses for herself and the children. 
16. The Petitioner is able to pay the anticipated child support and alimony. 
17. The children know the marital home as their home and it is a source of 
6 
stability for them. It is free of encumbrances. If the Court were to order the home sold, 
as the Petitioner has requested, it would probably have to substantially increase the 
alimony. Accordingly the Respondent and the minor children should be permitted to 
continue living in the home until the youngest child is eighteen years old, or until the 
Respondent and the children move out of the house. The Respondent will be 
responsible for the payment of the property taxes on the marital home. 
18. When the youngest child, Taylor Hallie Garlett, bom May 11,1994, 
is 18 years old or the Respondent and the children move out of the marital home, 
whichever occurs first, the house should be sold and the Petitioner and the Respondent 
will each receive one-half of the proceeds. 
19. The Petitioner and the Respondent own other marital assets. The 
business equipment should be awarded to the Petitioner because he needs these 
assets to earn a living to support himself and pay his alimony and child support, He 
should be required to pay all business debts. The business assets include the 1999 pickup 
and the business debts include all debts listed in Petitioner's Exhibit 7 and attached 
hereto as "Exhibit A" 
20. The Court believes there is very little value difference between the items 
which the Petitioner desires and the items which the Respondent desires. The most 
reasonable resolution of this dispute would be to award the Respondent the home 
furnishings and the jewelry and the Petitioner the sporting goods, except where they 
have made other arrangements. The Respondent should receive the computer and the 
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Suburban which she will be required to make all payments on. 
21. The boat and trailer and the camp trailer should be awarded to the 
Petitioner. 
22. The vacant lot should be sold and the first $10,500 of the sale proceeds 
after payment of the debt and any sale costs, should be paid to the Respondent to offset 
the gain made by Petitioner in Paragraph 21 of this document. The balance, if any, 
should be divided between the Petitioner and the Respondent equally. 
23. It has been established that the Petitioner failed to pay $4,800 in support 
for February to June, 2000. However, the Court's ultimate child support and alimony 
award is only $1,650 per month, $1050 per month in child support and $600 per month in 
alimony. It is therefore fair and appropriate that the Petitioner receive a credit of $350 per 
month, reducing the unpaid support obligation to $3,050, through June 1,2000, for which 
the Respondent should be awarded judgment. 
24. Each party should pay his or her own legal fees for this action up to the 
time of the trial. 
25. Each party should complete their mandatory divorce education. 
26. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other party 
any documents necessary to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered 
by the Court. 
27. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §62A-11-404 and §78-45-9, 
Charles S. Garlett's income should be subject to immediate and automatic income 
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withholding if a delinquency in payment of child support and alimony exists for thirty 
(30) days. Pursuant to §30-3-10.5, each month's child support and alimony payment 
shall be due one-half by the 5th day of each month, and the remaining one-half by the 
20th day of that month, and is delinquent thereafter. 
28. Pursuant to §78-45-7.15 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
the Petitioner should be required to maintain health, dental, optical and medical insurance 
on the minor children of the parties until each one reaches the age of eighteen. Petitioner 
and Respondent shall each be responsible for one-half of the premium on said insurance 
policy. 
The Petitioner and the Respondent shall share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical, dental, optical or medical treatment which is not covered by 
the insurance policy on the minor children including deductibles and copayments. The 
parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment The parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or 
to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to provide veri-
fication within 30 days of payment. 
29. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.16 (1953 as amended) 
both parties should share equally the reasonable work-related or career or occupational 
training costs for child care expenses of the Respondent. 
a. The non-custodial parent shall begin paying his share of child 
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care expenses on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of 
proof of the child care expenses. 
b> The custodial parent shall provide written verification of the cost 
and identity of a child care provider to the non-custodial parent upon 
initial engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other 
parent. The custodial parent shall notify the other parent of any change 
of a child care provider or the monthly expense of child care within 30 
calendar days of the date of the change. The custodial parent may be 
denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the one-
half of the expense if the parent incurring the expenses fails to comply 
with these provisions, 
30. Each party should be responsible for his or her own attorney's fees and 
court costs. 
Having found the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court therefore makes the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-1 (2) this Court has jurisdiction to 
decree the dissolution of the parties' marriage contract on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
Z, The parties have differences that are irreconcilable, making continuance of 
the marriage impossible. 
3. The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, to become absolute 
and final upon entry by the Court Jennifer T. Garlett, the Respondent, should be awarded 
the permanent and sole care, custody, and control of the parties three minor children: 
Travis Charles Garlett, bom January 28, 1987; Corie Elizabeth Garlett, bom August 15, 
1Q 
1990; and Taylor Hallie Garlett, born May 11,1994. 
4. It is in the best interest of the children that Charles S. Garlett, the 
Petitioner, have reasonable and liberal visitation in accordance with Utah Code 
Annotated §30-3-35 (Minimum schedule for visitation for children 5 to 18 years of 
age) as follows: 
a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or 
the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; 
b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry 
of the Decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, continuing each year; 
c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall 
not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial 
parent shall be responsible for the childrens' attendance at school for that school 
day; 
e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total 
holiday period extends beyond that time so that the children are free from school 
and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this 
lengthier holiday period; 
f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to 
the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial, he 
may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 
7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) Spring Break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day 
school lets out for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school 
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resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday. 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 
I p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to 
the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on 
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 
II p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) the Fall School Break, if applicable, commonly known as 
U.E.A. Weekend, beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 
7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
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(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday 
at 7 p.m.; 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined 
in subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 
9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
h) Father's Day shall be spent with the father every year beginning at 9 a.m. 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the mother every year beginning at 
9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the 
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of 
uninterrupted time during the childrens' summer vacation from school for 
purposes of vacation; 
1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended visitation shall be one-half of the vacation time for year-round school 
breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the children 
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable 
duration. 
5. The Petitioner is capable of earning, and has actually earned, at least 
000 per year. His child support obligation shall be based on the assumption that 
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he earns $50,000 per year. 
6. The Respondent's income will be based upon her working 30 hours 
per week at minimum wage. 
7. The Petitioner will receive from the Respondent the sum of $ 1,050 per 
month in child support, to be paid one-half before the 5th of the month for which it is 
due and the other half before the 20th of the month for which it is due. 
8. The Petitioner will receive from the Respondent the sum of $600 per 
month in alimony for the next sixteen years, which is the same as the duration of the 
marriage. The alimony payment will be paid one-half on or before the 5th of the month 
for which it is due and one-half on or before the 20th of the month for which it is due. 
The alimony will be taxable to the Respondent. 
9. The Petitioner will be awarded the sole use of the martial home for herself 
and the children until the youngest child is eighteen years of age or she and the children 
move out of the home, whichever occurs first. 
10. When the youngest child, Taylor Hallie Garlett, is eighteen years of age or 
the Petitioner and the children move out of the home, the home shall be sold and the 
Petitioner and the Respondent shall each receive one-half of the proceeds. 
1L The other marital assets of the parties shall be divided as follows: The 
Petitioner shall be awarded all the business equipment because he needs these assets to 
earn a living. He shall pay all business debts. The business assets include the 1999 
pickup truck and the business debts include all debts listed in Petitioner's Exhibit 7 and 
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attached hereto as "Exhibit A." The Respondent shall be awarded the home furnishings 
and the jewelry and the Petitioner the sporting goods, except where they have made other 
arrangements. The Respondent should receive the computer and the Suburban, which 
the Petitioner shall be required to pay for. The Petitioner shall be awarded the boat, 
trailer and the camp trailer. The vacant lot shall be sold and the first $10,5000 of the sale 
proceeds after payment of the debt and any sale costs, shall be paid to the Respondent to 
offset the gain made by the Petitioner in receiving the boat, trailer and the camp trailer. 
The balance of this sale, if any, shall be divided between the Petitioner and the 
Respondent equally. 
12. The Respondent is awarded a judgment for back child support and 
alimony in the amount of $3,050, covering the arrearages through June 2000. 
13. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §62A-11-404 and §78-45-9, 
Charles S. Garlett's income should be subject to immediate and automatic income 
withholding if a delinquency in payment of child support and alimony exists for thirty 
(30) days. Each month's child support and alimony payment shall be paid on or 
before the 5th of that month and is delinquent thereafter. 
14. Pursuant to §78-45-7.15 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
the Petitioner should be required to maintain health, dental, optical and medical insurance 
on the minor children of the parties until each one reaches the age of eighteen. Petitioner 
and Respondent shall each be responsible for one-half of the premium on said insurance 
policy. 
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The Petitioner and the Respondent shall share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical, dental, optical or medical treatment which is not covered by 
the insurance policy on the minor children including deductibles and copayments. The 
parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment, Tne parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or 
to recover the other parent*s share of the expenses if that parent fails to provide veri-
fication within 30 days of payment. 
15. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.16 (1953 as amended) 
both parties should share equally the reasonable work-related or career or occupational 
training costs for child care expenses of the Respondent 
a. The non-custodial parent shall begin paying his share of child 
care expenses on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of 
proof of the child care expenses. 
b, The custodial parent shall provide written verification of the cost 
and identity of a child care provider to the non-custodial parent upon 
initial engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other 
parent The custodial parent shall notify the other parent of any change 
of a child care provider or the monthly expense of child care within 30 
calendar days of the date of the change. The custodial parent may be 
denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the one-
half of the expense if the parent incurring the expenses fails to comply 
with these provisions. 
16. Each party shall pay his or her own legal fees in the divorce up to the 
Trial. 
17. Each party shall complete their mandatory divorce education course. 
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DATED this day of , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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